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A R T I C L E S
Plain Meaning, 
Precedent, and 
Metaphysics: 
Lessons in 
Statutory 
Interpretation 
From Analyzing 
the Elements of 
the Clean Water 
Act Offense
by Jeffrey G . Miller
Jeffrey Miller is Professor of Law Emeritus, Pace Law School .
Summary
This Article, the fifth in a series of five, completes 
the author’s detailed analysis of how federal courts 
have interpreted each element of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) offense . Compiling statistics across the 
four prior articles, it draws conclusions about statu-
tory interpretation in general, finding that the depth 
of legal analysis increases with the level of court; that 
environmentally positive results decrease with the 
level of court; that courts use only a small number 
of canons and other interpretive devices; that their 
uses of interpretive devices change over time; and that 
interpretive devices are not all outcome-neutral . The 
author also draws other lessons about statutory inter-
pretation that are specific to each element, and to the 
language and history of the CWA .
This Article completes the discussion of statutory interpretation of the elements of the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 offense: (1) any addition (2) of any pol-
lutant (3)  to navigable waters (4)  from any point source 
(5) by any person, except in compliance with a CWA per-
mit .2 It augments the author’s other recently published 
analyses for ELR News & Analysis of those elements .3
Many of the overarching observations made here are 
common sense . For instance, although law review edi-
tors might demand a citation for the conclusion that plain 
meaning and precedent are the most commonly used statu-
tory interpretation devices, most lawyers, judges, and legal 
scholars would agree with that assertion from their experi-
ences, without further authority . After all, most text means 
what it says and if there is precedent that particular text 
means what it says, so much the better . This Article pro-
vides strong, quantified evidence to verify the common-
sense proposition . The Article’s database is too narrow to 
provide proof positive, but there is no reason to believe that 
the conclusion is a function of that database . Studies of the 
interpretation of the CWA as a whole or of other statutes 
will undoubtedly reach the same conclusion and establish 
the proposition as a fact . Where text has no clear meaning 
or is ambiguous, plain meaning won’t help much; and if 
the interpretation is a matter of first impression, precedent 
may not help much either . In those situations, other inter-
pretive devices must be used .
Other observations made here are similarly common 
sense . For instance, consider the conclusion that, for the 
most part, plain meaning predominates as a canon of stat-
utory construction for the initial interpretations of a partic-
ular statutory text, but over time, precedent predominates . 
At the outset, there is no precedent available for most text, 
but hopefully there is plain meaning . Over time, as prec-
edent becomes available, it supplements or even supplants 
plain meaning . The data set studied in these articles dem-
onstrates that conclusion well . It contains three data sub-
1 . 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607. Section 301(a), 
33 U .S .C . §1311(a), sets out the CWA offense .
2 . Section §301(a) prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant” except in compli-
ance with a CWA permit . Section 502(12), 33 U .S .C . §1362(12), defines 
“discharge of a pollutant” as the multi-element offense printed in the text . 
The statute defines “pollutant” in §502(6), “navigable waters” in §502(7), 
“point source” in §502(5), and “person” in §502(14) . It does not define “ad-
dition .” (The author’s series of articles (see note 3, below) do not examine 
the fifth element, “person,” because it has not given rise to significant litiga-
tion or controversy .)
3 . Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the 
“Addition” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 44 ELR 10770 (Sept . 
2014); Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Pollut-
ant” Element of the Federal Water Pollution Offense, 44 ELR 10960 (Nov . 
2014); Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Navi-
gable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 10548 (June 
2015); and Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the 
“Point Source” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 11129 (Dec . 
2015) .
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sets where the proposition proves true and one data subset 
where it does not, and provides a logical and demonstrable 
reason why the outlying data subset does not conform to 
the general conclusion . Again, the database is too narrow 
to provide proof positive of the proposition, but there is no 
reason to believe that it is a function of the composition of 
the database .
Finally, some of the observations made here relate 
entirely to the interpretations of the particular texts stud-
ied . For instance, consider the issue of why courts have 
interpreted the element “navigable waters” twice as often 
as they have interpreted any of the other elements of the 
CWA offense . This Article concludes the reason is that the 
ratio of decisions under CWA §402, 33 U .S .C . §1342, to 
decisions under CWA §404, 33 U .S .C . §1344, is strongly 
weighted toward §404 in decisions interpreting the navi-
gable waters element, but not in decisions interpreting the 
other elements . This observation and its consequences are 
entirely functions of the composition of the database exam-
ined . The observation may prove useful in understanding 
the interpretation of this and other CWA text in which 
both CWA §§402 and 404 operate, but the observation is 
unlikely to be useful beyond interpreting the CWA . At the 
same time, asking analogous questions about interpreta-
tions of other statutory texts may lead to similarly illumi-
nating observations .
The author’s four earlier articles examining the ele-
ments of the CWA offense consider 258 decisions—all of 
the reported decisions between 1974 and 2013 interpreting 
the first four elements4 of the water pollution offense that 
the author could locate .5 There may be others, especially 
in unofficial reporters . If others exist, however, they are 
infrequently cited and hence are not important decisions 
for these interpretive issues . In any event, the universe of 
the opinions analyzed is broad enough to support the con-
clusions reached in the earlier articles and to support or 
suggest the conclusions reached in this Article . It should 
be noted that because many of the decisions interpret more 
than one element of the offense, the total number of judi-
cial interpretations analyzed in the four earlier articles is 
347 .6 Some of the pertinent data from the judicial interpre-
tations are summarized in Table B at the end of this Arti-
cle .7 Some of that data is objective—for example, a deci-
sion in a case brought under CWA §§402 or 404 . Some of 
the data is reasonably objective—for example, a decision 
4 . The articles do not examine the fifth element, “person,” because it has not 
given rise to significant litigation or controversy .
5 . See the decisions listed in Table A at the end of this Article.
6 . Count the numbers of judicial interpretations for each element listed in Table 
B at the end of this Article: 63 for Addition, 70 for Pollutant, 142 for Naviga-
ble Waters, and 72 for Point Source . Add the sums to derive the total number 
of judicial interpretations (347) in the 258 decisions listed in Table A .
7 . Table B is displayed in four subparts, one each for Addition, Pollutant, 
Navigable Waters, and Point Source . The data is drawn from but is slightly 
different than the data in the Tables B from the earlier articles cited supra, 
note 3 . One difference between the subparts in Table B to this Article and 
the Tables B in the previously published articles is that the former use a 
commonly numbered list of interpretive devices set forth on the first page 
of Table B herein, rather than the differently numbered lists in each of the 
earlier tables .
uses five identified interpretive devices . Unless a decision 
actually announces and labels each interpretive device it 
uses, however, different readers may occasionally draw dif-
ferent conclusions on both the number and the identity of 
the devices a decision uses . The author is reasonably certain 
of his count and identification of the interpretive devices 
used in the decisions, but is more sure that his count and 
identification are consistent throughout .
The reader may be assuming that an interpretive device 
is a canon of statutory construction . Most are, but inter-
pretive devices and canons of construction do not always 
coincide . The issue is complicated because there is no agree-
ment on the number or wording of canons of construction . 
Prof . William Eskridge documents the William Rehnquist 
Court’s use of 87 canons to interpret federal statutes .8 Prof . 
Bryan Garner and the late Justice Antonin Scalia discuss 53 
canons in their book on the interpretation of legal text and 
reject 13 ideas that others, including Eskridge, recognize or 
use as canons .9 Because there is no agreement on the uni-
verse of canons, some of the interpretive devices discussed 
here may not appear in any existing catalogue of canons, 
particularly the metaphor and metamorphosis devices .
Moreover, canons of construction are directive, that is, 
they suggest what a particular statutory phrase means . For 
instance, the plain meaning canon instructs us to inter-
pret a statute to mean exactly what it says . Some interpre-
tive devices, however, are not directive . For instance, the 
metaphor device does not direct a particular meaning, 
but suggests a way of visualizing an abstract legal issue or 
proposition to make it more understandable . The article 
on “Addition” observes that metaphors have been quite 
important in decisions interpreting that element .10 In those 
decisions, the uses of metaphor are striking and memora-
ble, more so than the uses of canons of construction in the 
decisions . This Article considers why metaphors have been 
important in interpreting the “addition” element but not 
the other elements .
The legitimacy of the canons of construction has 
been subject to academic dispute for some time . Karl N . 
Llewellyn noted more than half a century ago that for 
every canon that may apply in a given situation, there is an 
opposite canon, leading to the question whether the can-
ons have any value in statutory interpretation .11 Because 
there is no canon instructing a court how to decide which 
of two competing, opposite canons governs in a particular 
situation, the canons may be seen as just handy devices 
for courts to justify the interpretive results to which they 
are independently inclined . The canons are sometimes 
8 . William N . Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Construction 323-33 
(1987) .
9 . Antonin Scalia & Bryan A . Garner, Reading Law: The Interpreta-
tion of Legal Texts (2012) . Compare with the more extensive universe of 
canons identified by Eskridge .
10 . See supra note 3, 44 ELR 10793-94 .
11 . Karl N . Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons of How Statutes Are to Be Constructed, 3 Vand . L . Rev . 395, 401 
(1950) . For a more contemporary criticism of the same nature, see Richard 
A . Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U . Chi . L . Rev . 800, 806 (1983) .
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described as devices to identify legislative intent when stat-
utory language is ambiguous, raising both practical and 
separation-of-powers concerns .
The practical concern is whether legislative intent can 
exist beyond the enacted language of a statute . The usual 
pieces of evidence cited for legislative intent are the remarks 
of individual members of the U .S . Congress on the floors 
of the U .S . House of Representatives or the U .S . Senate, or 
groups of such members in committee and subcommittee 
reports, usually written by staff . However, remarks by indi-
vidual members of Congress, by definition, do not identify 
the intent of Congress as a whole . Nor do reports of com-
mittees or subcommittees . The only unquestionable indica-
tion of legislative intent is the wording of the statute . The 
separation-of-powers concern is another side of the first 
concern . Gleaning congressional intent from statements 
by individual members of Congress, groups of members, 
or congressional staff allows them to usurp the Article I 
authority of Congress .
Legislative intent is even murkier when statutory word-
ing is deliberately ambiguous, poorly masking political 
compromise . Judicial interpretation of deliberately ambig-
uous statutory language must inevitably come down on 
one side or another of the congressional compromise . Do 
courts thereby usurp the Article I authority of Congress? 
This dilemma helps explains the enduring use of canons 
of construction, despite their recognized shortcomings . 
A court must decide the case before it, even when the 
applicable statute is ambiguous . Unless a judge throws up 
her hands and protests she has no basis to interpret the 
statute,12 the judge has only the means judges have used for 
decades, indeed for centuries, to make such resolutions: the 
canons of construction .13
The observations made in Part I of this Article relate to 
statutory interpretation in general . What interpretive devices 
do the courts use and when do they use them? Do the inter-
pretive devices used affect outcomes? Do the interpretive 
devices used change over time? If so, does the change rep-
resent evolution in jurisprudence generally or the evolution 
and maturation of judicial interpretations of the statutory 
text at issue? We might expect both . The lessons discussed in 
Part II of this Article are comparative . The four elements of 
the water pollution offense studied in the earlier articles are 
very different in nature . Do those differences cause courts to 
approach interpreting each of the elements in singular man-
ners? We might expect that as well .
Much of the analysis in this Article is based on compar-
ing numbers of decisions or judicial interpretations in the 
decisions calculated for different purposes . For instance, it 
concludes that legal analysis is deeper as a case ascends up 
12 . See United States v . Robison, 521 F . Supp . 2d 1247 (N .D . Ala . 2007), in 
which a senior judge threw up his hands and instructed the clerk to reassign 
the case for trial because Rapanos v. United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 
20116 (2006), and its progeny made it impossible for him to interpret the 
CWA offense element “navigable waters .”
13 . See Jonathan R . Macey & Geoffrey P . Miller, The Canons of Statutory Con-
struction and Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand L . Rev . 647 (1992); Lawrence C . 
Marshall, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Constraints: A 
Response to Macey and Miller, 45 Vand . L . Rev . 673 (1992) .
the judicial appellate chain, based, in large part, on the num-
bers of devices that the U .S . Supreme Court, circuit courts 
of appeals, and district courts used to interpret the elements . 
The Article states the results of these number counts, but 
does not reproduce the author’s mathematical calculations . 
Footnotes explain how the author made those calculations 
from data in Tables A and B . The reader can verify the num-
bers by making the same calculations .14 Indeed, the reader 
may be able to make other entirely different, but pertinent, 
calculations and observations from the data .
I. Conclusions Regarding Statutory 
Interpretation Generally
A. Depth of Legal Analysis Increases With Level of 
Court
In theory, the scrutiny of a legal issue should become more 
intense as a case works its way up the appellate ladder . At 
each step in the appeal process, the number of contested 
legal issues usually decreases, while focus on the remain-
ing issues usually becomes narrower and more precise . 
Moreover, an appellate court has the advantage of both 
the analyses of the legal issues by the parties before it and 
by the courts and parties in the courts below . When the 
appellate court is the Supreme Court and the federal cir-
cuits have split on the issue before the Court, these analyses 
could include the opinions of several federal circuits and 
several district courts, as well as briefs by the parties before 
them . And, of course, the Supreme Court will also have the 
advantage of analyses in amici briefs and in a brief from the 
Solicitor General, representing the United States as a party 
or as amicus .15 The circuit courts may occasionally have the 
benefit of briefs by amici and the Solicitor General, but the 
Supreme Court almost always does .
A logical indication of the depth of judicial analysis of 
an issue is the number of interpretive devices a court uses in 
its opinion analyzing the issue . In general, a decision using 
multiple interpretive devices exhibits a greater depth of legal 
analysis than a decision using only one or two interpretive 
devices to resolve the issue . Not surprisingly, the numbers of 
devices courts used in decisions interpreting an element of 
the CWA offense increased as the level of the courts render-
ing them increased . Thus, while courts on average used 2 .7 
interpretive devices to analyze an element,16 Supreme Court 
14 . In doing so, however, the reader must be careful to observe the difference 
between numbers of decisions in Table A and numbers of judicial interpre-
tations in decisions in Table B .
15 . Supreme Court Rule 37 .4 authorizes the Solicitor General to file an amicus 
brief without either the consent of the parties or a motion approved by the 
Court . In addition, the Court often requests the Solicitor General to file an 
amicus brief in cases in which the government is not a party . Rebecca Mea 
Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law 5, 18, 142-45 
(1992) . For a fascinating discussion of the role of the Solicitor General gen-
erally, see Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General 
and the Rule of Law (1988) .
16 . To calculate the average number of interpretive devices used in all judi-
cial interpretations of the elements, add the number of interpretive devices 
shown in Column F of Table B for every element by all levels of court and 
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analyses used an average of 4 .5 interpretive devices, circuit 
court analyses used an average of 3 .0 interpretive devices, 
and district court analyses used an average of 2 .3 interpre-
tive devices .17 By this objective measure, legal analysis of the 
contested statutory interpretation becomes deeper as the 
level of the interpreting court increases .
B. Environmentally Positive Results Decrease With 
Level of Court
Environmentally positive results in the context of the deci-
sions analyzed in these articles are interpretations of an 
element of the CWA offense finding jurisdiction rather 
than denying jurisdiction—for example, interpreting 
an element expansively as opposed to narrowly . Finding 
jurisdiction authorizes greater control of water pollution, 
usually an environmentally positive result, while denying 
jurisdiction restricts control of water pollution, usually an 
environmentally negative result .18 Overall, courts reached 
environmentally positive results in 76% of the interpreta-
tions examined here .19 District courts reached environ-
mentally positive results in 80% of the interpretations 
examined here, circuit courts in 70%, and the Supreme 
Court in 54% .20
Do not assume, from the decreasing percent of envi-
ronmentally positive interpretations as the level of court 
increases, that appellate courts generally and the Supreme 
Court in particular, are hostile to water pollution control 
or environmental protection . The author’s earlier analysis 
of Supreme Court opinions under the CWA determined 
that although the Supreme Court’s CWA decisions were 
statistically unfavorable to water pollution control, they 
did not demonstrate that the Court had an anti-environ-
mental bias .21
For instance, many of the Court’s decisions were based, 
in whole or in part, on deference to the U .S . Environmen-
tal Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) interpretation of the CWA, 
a general doctrine of administrative law rather than one 
specific to the CWA or environmental protection . In such 
decisions, the Court asks only if the statute is ambiguous 
divide by the number of interpretations for all elements by all levels of court 
(347), as shown in Table B .
17 . To calculate the average number of interpretive devices used in judicial inter-
pretations by a particular level of court, add the number of interpretive devices 
shown in Column F of Table B for every decision interpreting every element 
by that level of court and divide the sum by the number of decisions interpret-
ing all of the elements by that level of court, as show on Table B .
18 . While in theory there may be situations in which the reverse is true, the 
author does not believe any of the decisions analyzed in this Article present 
such situations .
19 . To calculate the percent of environmentally positive results for all interpre-
tations, count the pluses (+) in Column C of Table B for all elements by all 
levels of court (260) and divide the sum by the total number of interpreta-
tions (347) .
20 . To calculate the percent of environmentally positive interpretations of the 
elements by a particular level of court, count the pluses (+) for interpreta-
tions by that level of court in Column C of Table B for all elements and 
divide that sum by the total number of interpretations by that level of court 
for all elements as shown on Table B .
21 . Jeffrey G . Miller, The Court’s Water Pollution Jurisprudence: Is the Court All 
Wet?, 24 Va . Envtl . L .J . 125 (2005) .
on the contested issue and, if so, whether the administering 
agency’s interpretation of the statute on that issue is a rea-
sonable one .22 When courts reach environmentally nega-
tive results based on deference to EPA’s interpretation of its 
statute, it is the Agency’s interpretation of the CWA that 
is environmentally negative rather than the Court’s inter-
pretation; the Court is merely affirming that while EPA’s 
interpretation may not be the only reasonable one, it is at 
least among the set of reasonable interpretations .23
If the increasing percent of negative environmental 
interpretations of the elements observed as cases move up 
the judicial chain is not caused by hostility toward clean 
water by appellate courts, perhaps the increasingly nega-
tive environmental results are caused by the greater depth 
of legal analysis, which also occurs as cases move up the 
judicial chain . That suggestion can be tested by compar-
ing the environmental results of lower court interpretations 
exhibiting greater depths of analysis with lower court inter-
pretations generally, removing the variable of court level 
from the analyses . District court interpretations, of which 
76% have positive environmental results, have only 67% 
positive environmental results when they use five or more 
interpretive devices .24 Similarly, circuit court interpreta-
tions, of which 70% have environmentally positive results, 
have only 50% environmentally positive results when they 
use six or more interpretive devices .
This finding confirms that there is a correlation between 
increasing depth of analysis and increasing environmen-
tally negative outcome . What does this correlation mean? 
One possibility is that it requires greater depth of analy-
sis to reach an environmentally negative result . That does 
not make intuitive sense . The more likely possibility is that 
courts feel compelled to provide greater justification to the 
public for environmentally negative results interpreting a 
statute designed to protect the environment than for envi-
ronmentally positive results interpreting that statute .
C. Courts Commonly Use Only a Small Number of 
Interpretive Devices
As discussed above, there is no agreed-upon catalogue of 
interpretive devices or canons of statutory construction . 
Despite a large but indeterminate number of devices avail-
22 . See Chevron, U .S .A ., Inc . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, 467 U .S . 837, 14 
ELR 20507 (1984); Mead Corp . v . United States, 533 U .S . 218 (2001) .
23 . The author’s earlier article concluded, however, that while the Court may be 
agnostic on environmental protection, it is increasingly antagonistic toward 
citizen participation in administrative and enforcement processes, which in 
turn has led to increasingly environmentally negative results .
24 . To calculate the percent of positive environmental results for decisions by 
a particular level of court using a particular number of interpretive devices, 
add the total number of decisions with positive results, indicated with a 
plus (+) in Column C on Table B for all elements by that level of court also 
showing the desired number of interpretive devices used in Column F on 
Table B, for that level of court and divide that sum by the total number of 
decisions by that level of court for all elements . The Article uses six or more 
devices for circuit court decisions and five or more devices for district court 
decisions because circuit courts use more interpretive devices than district 
courts . Because this comparison is between average decisions and those us-
ing the largest numbers of devices, it was appropriate to use a larger cutoff 
for circuit court decisions than for district court decisions .
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14 times .32 The courts’ limited use of these devices follows 
from the fact they come into play only to interpret statu-
tory exceptions . Because only two of the four elements 
studied have exceptions, and they are narrow, courts are 
not likely to use these devices frequently enough to place 
them in the primary or secondary groups of devices .
Other tertiary interpretive devices are of similar limited 
applicability . For instance, courts used the rule of lenity 
only twice .33 That, too, is understandable, for lenity applies 
only in criminal prosecutions . Although the interpretation 
of any of the four elements may be at issue in a criminal 
prosecution, the limited number of criminal prosecutions 
compared to other types of legal actions in the interpreta-
tions studied (31 of 347),34 significantly lessens the likeli-
hood of lenity being a primary or secondary interpretive 
device in these decisions .
Similarly, the canon of interpreting a statute to avoid 
constitutional issues is used only 11 times .35 It applies only 
when a constitutional issue is evident, and in the cases ana-
lyzed here, the only constitutional issue apparent is with 
regard to federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction to regu-
late pollution in navigable waters—the “navigable waters” 
element of the CWA offense .36 Likewise, the interpretive 
device of honoring federalism was used only five times .37 
As with avoiding constitutional issues, it applies only when 
the constitutional or traditional boundary between fed-
eral and state powers might be impinged . Again, in these 
decisions, federalism is most likely to be involved at the 
intersection of federal and state jurisdiction under the 
Commerce Clause . Other tertiary interpretive devices are 
of similarly limited applicability .38
Many of the other canons of construction catalogued 
by Eskridge, Justice Scalia, and Garner are by their nature 
simply not susceptible to use interpreting the elements 
of the water pollution offense . For instance, the seventh 
canon listed by Eskridge, “‘[m]ay’ is usually precatory, 
whereas ‘shall’ is usually mandatory,”39 is irrelevant to 
interpretation of the elements of the CWA offense because 
none of the elements or their statutory definitions use 
either “may” or “shall .” Although the author makes no 
systematic attempt here to narrow the canons identified 
32 . Count the number of times interpretive device 11 or 12 is listed in Column 
E of Table B for all elements .
33 . Count the number of times interpretive device 17 is listed in Column E of 
Table B for any element .
34 . Count the number of times “Crim .” is listed in Column D of Table B for 
any element .
35 . Count the number of times interpretive device 5 is listed in Column E of 
Table B for any element .
36 . Interpretive device 5 is listed in Column E in Table B 10 times for navigable 
waters, and only once for any other element .
37 . Interpretive device 15 is listed in Column E of Table B only for navi-
gable waters .
38 . For instance, the canon of interpreting waivers applies only when a statu-
tory provision includes a waiver . There are no waivers in any of the ele-
ments of the CWA . In the judicial interpretation decisions analyzed in 
these articles, the issue arises in the context of parties waiving their rights 
to litigate a legal issue by entering a consent decree . United States v . Rueth 
Dev . Co ., 335 F .3d 598 (7th Cir . 2003) . The canon of interpreting a statute 
to harmonize with other statutes applies only when two statutes overlap or 
possibly collide .
39 . See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 323 .
able, the decisions studied in these articles used only 25 
devices to interpret the elements of the CWA .25 But even 
that number is deceptively large, for the courts used all but 
a few of the 25 infrequently . Courts used the 25 devices a 
total of 940 times in the 347 judicial interpretations deci-
sions studied .26 But in 47% of the 940 times that courts use 
an interpretive device, they used only two: precedent (268 
times), and plain meaning (175) .27 The Article labels these 
the primary devices (used more than 105 times each), at 
least for the purposes of these analyses .
The courts used one of only seven additional devices in 
another 42% of the 940 total uses: broad interpretation 
(104 uses); deference to agency interpretation (93); struc-
ture of the statute (70); legislative history (67); avoid absurd 
results (32); harmonize with other statutes (30); and avoid 
constitutional issues (11) .28 The Article labels these the 
secondary devices (each used between 10 and 105 times) . 
Courts used the remaining 16 interpretive devices between 
one and nine times .29 The Article labels these the tertiary 
or incidental devices . The courts’ use of the tertiary devices 
is limited in another way . They used 14 of the 16 tertiary 
devices to interpret only one or two of the four elements .30 
These 14 narrowly used devices constitute more than one-
half of the 25 total devices used and more than two-thirds 
of the 16 tertiary devices used .
With all of the interpretive devices available, why would 
courts use so few of them in these decisions? Why would 
they use only nine of the 25 more than 1% of the time?31 
Why would they use almost one-half of the devices to 
interpret only one or two of the four elements? The answers 
to these questions lie in the nature of interpretive devices . 
Most, by their very wordings, are of limited applicability . 
For instance, courts used the two tertiary devices “inter-
pret exceptions narrowly” and “if a rule has an exception, 
in the absence of the exception, the rule applies” a total of 
25 . The devices are listed in Table B Explanation for Columns in Table B for 
Each Element, and are shown in Column E of Table B .
26 . To calculate the number of times the interpretations used interpretive de-
vices (940), count the numbers in Column F of Table B for each element 
and add the four totals .
27 . To calculate the number of judicial interpretations using a primary interpre-
tive device, count the numbers of times each of interpretive devices 23 and 
22 (precedent and plain meaning) is listed in Column F of Table B for all 
elements . To calculate the percent that figure represents of the total number 
of interpretations using a particular interpretive device, divide that figure by 
the total number of times an interpretive device was used (940) .
28 . To calculate the number of judicial interpretations using secondary inter-
pretive devices, count the number of times each of interpretive devices 1, 
4, 5, 7, 16, 21, and 24 is listed in Column E of Table B for all elements. To 
calculate the percent that figure represents of the total number of times the 
interpretations used an interpretive device, divide that figure by the total 
number of times an interpretive device was used (940) .
29 . To calculate the number of interpretations using tertiary interpretive de-
vices, count the number of times each of interpretive devices 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 25 is listed in Column E of Table 
B for any element .
30 . Count the number of interpretations for which both (1) interpretive de-
vice 1 or 2 appears in Column F of Table B for all elements; and (2) one 
or more of the tertiary interpretive devices is listed in Column E of Table 
B for any element .
31 . Because none of the tertiary devices was used more than nine times, the 
use of any of them was less than 1% of the total of 940 uses of interpretive 
devices in these decisions, as calculated above .
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by those authorities to canons that may be susceptible to 
interpreting the elements of the CWA offense, many other 
canons they identify are irrelevant to those elements .40 In 
conclusion, only a handful of the interpretive devices are 
generally useful; many canons are useful only in limited 
situations not at issue when interpreting the elements of 
the CWA offense .
D. Uses of Interpretive Devices Change Over Time
Neither the identity nor the order of the frequency of use 
of the primary interpretive devices changed between the 
earliest and latest sets of interpretations .41 In the earliest 
set of interpretations, the two most used devices and the 
numbers of their uses were precedent (42) and plain mean-
ing (37) .42 In the latest set of interpretations, the two most 
used devices and their numbers of uses were precedent (58) 
and plain meaning (38) .43
During the same period, however, the order and the 
frequency of use of the secondary interpretive devices 
changed considerably . In the earliest set of interpretations, 
the numbers of uses for the secondary interpretive devices 
were legislative history (26 uses), broad interpretation (25), 
40 . For instance, see id. at 325 (the “rule against congressional interference with 
the president’s authority over foreign affairs and national security”); id. (the 
“rule against congressional curtailment of the judiciary’s ‘inherent powers’ 
or its equity powers ”); id. at 326 (the “presumption against application of 
federal statutes to state and local political processes”); id. at 327 (the “[r]ule 
against state taxation of Indian tribes and reservation activities”); and id . at 
328 (the “rule against extraterritorial application of U .S . law”) .
41 . The earliest and latest sets of interpretations used in this analysis are the 
20% of the judicial interpretations that are the first in time and the 20% 
of the judicial interpretations that are the latest in time interpreting each 
element . The earliest and latest sets of interpretations cannot be reduced to 
periods of years for all elements because they are calculated by percentages 
of interpretations of each element rather than by years . Even for a particular 
element, the uniform percentages of early and late decisions sometimes does 
not conform to particular years, in which case district court decisions are 
dropped until the requisite percentage is reached . For ease of identification, 
these judicial interpretations are highlighted in Table B . The highlighted 
interpretations are visually easy to distinguish as the earliest and latest for 
each court, except for the Supreme Court’s interpretations of “pollutant,” all 
of which are highlighted . The first Supreme Court interpretation of pollut-
ant is in the earliest set of interpretations and the second and third are in 
the latest set of interpretations . For addition, there are 12 early and 12 late 
interpretations . The earliest are 100, 107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 123, 125, 
238, 245, 247, and 249; and the latest judicial interpretations are 5, 12, 
18, 24, 26, 27, 37 136, 145, 152, 154, and 160 . For pollutant, there are 14 
early and 14 late judicial interpretations . The earliest are 10, 11, 105, 110, 
117, 120, 122, 124, 235, 236, 238, 241, 246, and 247; and the latest are 
3, 27, 40, 53, 130, 133, 146, 152, 157, 159, 166, 167, 169, and 170 . For 
navigable waters, there are 27 early and 27 late judicial interpretations . The 
earliest are 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 126, 127, 235, 
236, 237, 239, 241, 243, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, and 
258; and the latest interpretations for navigable waters are 1, 15, 16, 19, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 
142, 142, 143, 144, 1471, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 128, 
129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142, 142, 143, 144, 147, and 153 . 
For point sources, there are 14 early and 14 late judicial interpretations . The 
earliest interpretations are 108, 110, 111, 113, 116, 119, 123, 240, 241, 
242, 244, 247, 251, and 259; and the latest judicial interpretations for point 
source are 2, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 138, 140, 141, 148, and 149 .
42 . Count the number of times interpretive devices 23, 22, and 16 (precedent, 
plain meaning, and legislative history) are listed in Column E of Table B for 
all elements for the earliest set of interpretations identified in note 41 .
43 . Count the number of times interpretive devices 23 and 22 (precedent and 
plain meaning) are listed in Column E of Table B for all elements for the 
latest set of interpretations identified in note 41 .
structure of the statute (17), deference (10), harmonize 
with other statutes (6), and avoid absurd results (2) .44 In the 
latest set of interpretations, the numbers of uses for the sec-
ondary interpretive devices were deference (24 uses), broad 
interpretation (17), structure (15), avoid absurd results (6), 
harmonize with other statutes (8), and legislative history 
(5) .45 Between the earliest and latest sets of interpretations, 
legislative history moved from the most used of the second-
ary devices to the least used and deference moved from the 
fourth most used to the most used . Although broad inter-
pretation was the second most used device in both periods, 
its use declined from 24 in the earliest period to 17 in the 
latest period .
The most remarkable change over time is the drastic 
decline in the use of legislative history to interpret the ele-
ments, coupled with a less substantial decline in the use of 
the broad interpretation canon . In the earliest set of deci-
sions, courts used legislative history in 25 interpretations, 
while in the latter period, they used legislative history in 
only five interpretations . Use of the broad interpretation 
canon declined from 25 to 17 interpretations between the 
same periods . The two are causally linked because legisla-
tive history emphasizes that “navigable waters” should be 
interpreted broadly .46 Without reading the legislative his-
tory, courts will not know that Congress intended them 
to interpret the navigable waters term broadly . Thus, 
uses of the legislative history and broad reading devices 
go hand-in-hand . While the courts’ use of both of these 
devices declined, the use of precedent between the two 
periods increased from 42 to 58, the use of plain meaning 
increased from 37 to 38, and the use of deference increased 
from 10 to 24 . Although the increases in the uses of prec-
edent and deference may in part reflect the substitution of 
these devices for the recently disfavored legislative history 
and broad interpretation devices, the increases also repre-
sent the growth over time of the number of precedents to 
cite and the number of EPA interpretations to which defer-
ence is accorded .
These changes in the uses of interpretive methods may 
have caused or at least influenced the outcomes of deci-
sions . In the earliest set of interpretations, courts reached 
environmentally positive results in 53 of the 67 interpre-
tations (80%), while during the most recent set of inter-
pretations, they reached environmentally positive results in 
48 of the 67 interpretations (72%) .47 The drop was most 
remarkable in interpretations of “navigable waters,” where 
44 . Count the number of times interpretive devices 16, 4, 24, 6, 21, and 1 (leg-
islative history, broad interpretation, structure of the statute, deference, har-
monize with other statutes, and avoid absurd results) are listed in Column E 
of Table B for all elements in the earliest set of interpretations identified in 
note 41 .
45 . Count the number of times interpretive devices 7, 4, 24, 1, 21, and 16 (def-
erence, broad interpretation, structure of the statute, avoid absurd results, 
harmonize with other statutes, and legislative history) are listed in Column 
E of Table B for all elements in the latest set of interpretations identified in 
note 41 .
46 . See discussion of legislative history of “navigable waters” in Miller, 45 ELR 
10551-54, supra note 3.
47 . Calculate the number of times (+) is listed in Column C of Table B for 
all elements for the earliest and latest sets of interpretations identified 
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While this criticism of legislative history suggests cau-
tion against overreliance on it, the criticism does not war-
rant abandoning it altogether . The criticism is not the only 
or necessarily the best analysis of the subject .55 And when 
applied to the CWA, it has an unduly negative impact, for 
it ignores the overwhelming legislative support for the stat-
ute and its broad interpretation .56 Of course, Justice Scalia 
is averse to the broad interpretation canon as well .57
The other conspicuous changes in the numbers of uses 
of the interpretive devices between the early and late peri-
ods are the relative uses of plain meaning and precedent . 
In the earlier period, courts used precedent in 42 inter-
pretations and plain meaning in 37 . In the later period, 
courts used precedent in 58 interpretations, an increase of 
16, and plain meaning in 38 interpretations, an increase 
of one .58 The much greater increase in the use of precedent 
than in the use of plain meaning reflects the growing body 
of precedent available to support interpretation of the ele-
ments . At the outset of CWA litigation, almost by defini-
tion, there was no precedent (except for navigable waters) 
to draw on and close examination of the plain meaning, 
legislative history, and structure of the statute were the pri-
mary means available to courts to interpret it . Indeed, in 
1980 (eight years after the enactment of the CWA), there 
were only 30 precedents interpreting a few issues under the 
four elements, and 20 of them were precedents for inter-
preting navigable waters .59
After several decades of CWA litigation, however, there 
are now more than 347 interpretations of the elements60 
illuminating multiple aspects, enabling courts in many 
cases to decide issues based on precedent alone . Indeed, 
the number of decisions using only one interpretive device 
grew from 16 in the earliest set of interpretations to 24 
in the latest set, and 15 of the 24 later interpretations use 
precedent as the sole device, while only four of the earlier 
16 interpretations did so .61 The scant increase in the use of 
plain meaning over time does not reflect jurisprudential 
disfavor of that device—indeed, it is the preferred analyti-
cal tool of the same new textualists who advocate the aban-
donment of legislative history . Rather, it indicates a steady 
use of plain meaning in contrast to the great increase in the 
55 . Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 
S . Cal . L . Rev . 845 (1992) .
56 . To enact the CWA, Congress voted by a supermajority to override President 
Richard Nixon’s veto . See Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 787, 36 
ELR 20116 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) .
57 . Scalia & Garner, supra note 9, 364-66 (“The false notion that reme-
dial statutes should be liberally construed” is one of their “Thirteen 
Falsities Exposed .”) .
58 . Compare the number of times interpretive devices 22 and 23 (plain mean-
ing and precedent) are listed in Column E of Table B for all elements, for 
the earliest and latest sets of interpretations identified in note 41 .
59 . Count the number of judicial interpretations dated 1980 or before in Col-
umn B of Table B for all elements .
60 . While these articles examine 258 reported decisions with 347 judicial in-
terpretations of the elements through 2013, the number of precedents has 
continued to grow after that date .
61 . Compare the number of times 1 is listed in Column F of Table B for all ele-
ments in the earliest interpretations and the latest interpretations identified 
above, and compare the number of times in those interpretations that the 
sole device listed in Column E is 23 (precedent) .
environmentally positive results dropped from 25 (92%) 
to 19 (70%) between the same periods .48 In these inter-
pretations of navigable waters, the use of legislative history 
dropped from 16 in the earliest interpretations to one in 
the latest ones and the use of broad interpretation dropped 
from 17 in the earliest interpretations to eight in the lat-
est ones .49 As noted above, congressional admonition to 
interpret an element broadly is more prominent in the leg-
islative history of navigable waters than in the legislative 
history of the other elements .50 The precipitous decline in 
judicial cognizance of these congressional voices for the 
liberal construction of the CWA offense’s elements gener-
ally, and of navigable waters in particular, appears to have 
caused the decline in the courts’ environmentally positive 
interpretations of the elements between the earlier and 
later decisions .
The decline in the use of legislative history to interpret 
the elements generally and navigable water particularly is 
attributable directly to attacks on the legitimacy of legisla-
tive history as an interpretive device by the new textualists, 
led by Justice Scalia .51 Their main argument is that the 
intent of Congress is embodied in the statute itself rather 
than in committee reports or remarks of individual legisla-
tors .52 Even if statements by individual members or groups 
of members can be taken at face value,53 they represent 
only the intent of individual members or members of com-
mittees (or of the majorities of their members), not of Con-
gress itself . If the intent of Congress is represented only in 
the statute it enacted, then the plain meaning of its text is 
the primary and most important interpretive device .54
in note 41 and divide by the total number of the earliest and latest sets 
of interpretations .
48 . Calculate the number of times (+) is listed in Column C of Table B for the 
Navigable Waters element for the earliest and latest sets of interpretations 
identified in note 41 . Divide the sums by 27, the number of interpretations 
of Navigable Waters in each period .
49 . Count the number of times interpretive device 4 is used in Column E of 
Table B for all elements, for the earliest and latest sets of interpretations 
identified in note 41 .
50 . Compare discussions in Miller, 45 ELR 10548, 10551-54 with Miller, 44 
ELR 10770, 10773; Miller, 44 ELR 10960, 10962-63; and Miller, 45 ELR 
11129-31, supra note 3 .
51 . See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 207-38; Scalia & Garner, supra note 9, at 
391-96 .
52 . See Scalia & Garner, supra note 9, at 369-90 . See also Bank One Chicago, 
N .A . v . Midwest Bank & Trust Co ., 516 U .S . 264, 279-80 (1996) (Scalia, J ., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v . Estate 
of Romani, 523 U .S . 517, 535-37 (1998) (Scalia, J ., concurring); Blanchard 
v . Bergeron, 489 U .S . 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J ., concurring); Thompson 
v . Thompson, 484 U .S . 174, 191-92 (1998) (Scalia, J ., concurring) .
53 . Query whether individual members of Congress voting to enact the CWA 
in 1972 intended a particular meaning for addition or for the other ele-
ments and, if they did, whether we can trust the members to have disclosed 
their true intent in their floor remarks or otherwise . Would they have voted 
against the 200-page-long CWA if they did not agree with its definition 
of one of the elements? If not, was their intent to have another definition? 
What interpretive value is their intent?
54 . Justice Scalia tells us plain meaning is the basic and most important canon . 
Scalia & Garner, supra note 9, at 56-58, 69-77 . Although not a textual-
ist, Eskridge agrees . Eskridge, supra note 8, at 223 . Others contend plain 
meaning is the starting place for any interpretation of a statute and hence is 
not a canon of construction; the canons come into play only if there is no 
plain meaning . See Abner J . Mikva & Eric Lane, Legislative Process 689 
(3d ed . 2009) .
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use of precedent as the number of precedents available for 
use increases .
E. Interpretive Devices Are Not All Outcome-Neutral
One apparent question arising from this study is whether 
use of particular interpretive devices leads to predominantly 
positive or negative environmental results . Because the 
devices were not designed only to interpret environmental 
statutes, however, the question is a broader one . Are particu-
lar interpretive devices designed to lead to predominately 
expansive or restrictive interpretations of statutes? Compar-
ing the percentage of all interpretations studied reaching 
environmentally positive results with the percentage of inter-
pretations reaching environmentally positive results using 
particular interpretive devices may shed some light on this 
issue . Overall, the decisions studied in these articles reached 
environmentally positive results or expansive interpretations 
in 76% of their interpretations of the four elements .
Predictably, environmentally positive results or expan-
sive interpretations were similar for decisions using the 
precedent and plain meaning devices: 76% for precedent 
and 73% for plain meaning .62 Because these two primary 
interpretive devices were used in most of the decisions 
studied, their positive environmental results or expansive 
interpretations could not differ markedly from the overall 
environmental results of all the decisions . In that respect, 
their use interpreting the elements is environmentally neu-
tral . The only frequently used device that reached envi-
ronmentally positive results or expansive interpretations 
significantly more often than the average is broad interpre-
tation, used in decisions reaching environmentally positive 
results in 83% of the times used .63 That should be no sur-
prise, for the canon explicitly calls for expansive interpreta-
tions of remedial statutes .
Most of the other devices reached positive environmen-
tal results or expansive interpretations in less than 75% 
of their uses . That is consistent with the earlier conclu-
sion that courts used more interpretive devices to reach 
environmentally negative decisions or restrictive statu-
tory interpretation than to reach environmentally positive 
decisions . Devices used to achieve environmentally posi-
tive results or restrictive interpretations 50% or less of the 
time, however, may depart sufficiently from the norm to be 
examined as potential environmentally negative or restric-
tive devices . They are: rule of the last antecedent, used 
four times, 50% environmentally positive results; avoid 
62 . To calculate the percent of environmentally positive results using interpre-
tive device 22 or 23 (plain meaning and precedent), count the total number 
of times that 22 or 23 is listed in Column E of Table B for all elements, 
count the number of times those interpretations have a plus (+) in column 
C of Table B for all elements and divide the second sum by the first sum .
63 . Although the decisions using the devices of metaphor and interpret waivers 
narrowly reached environmentally positive results 100% of the time, courts 
used metaphor only five times and the waiver device only twice, too few to 
signal that they may be positively oriented interpretive devices . Calculate 
the percent of environmentally positive results using interpretive device 4 
(broad interpretation) in the same manner as for interpretive devices 22 or 
23 (plain meaning and precedent), but substituting interpretive device 4 for 
interpretive devices 22 or 23 .
constitutional issues, used 11 times, 45% environmentally 
positive results; ejusdem generis, used five times, 40% envi-
ronmentally positive results; equity, used once, 0% envi-
ronmentally positive results; expressio unius, used three 
times, 33% environmentally positive results; honor federal-
ism, used five times, 40% environmentally positive results; 
rule of lenity, used twice, 50% environmentally positive 
results; noscitur a sociis, used twice, 50% environmentally 
positive results; and harmonize with other statutes, used 31 
times, 42% environmentally positive results .64
Courts used most of these devices so infrequently that 
there is insufficient data to analyze . Two of the devices, 
however, are secondary interpretive devices: avoid constitu-
tional issues and harmonize with other statutes . These two 
devices are similar in that they invite or justify abandon-
ing plain meaning, precedent, or even the integrity of the 
text being interpreted, here the CWA, in favor of the effec-
tiveness of another text, such as the U .S . Constitution or 
another statute . As applied in a case arising under the CWA, 
they are conceptually environmentally negative devices and 
the results of their use in fact yield environmentally negative 
decisions in a significant percentage of cases . This analysis 
applies as well to some of the tertiary interpretive devices, for 
instance, honor federalism . That canon too invites abandon-
ing the plain meaning of a statute in favor of an interpreta-
tion more favorable to states’ rights .
II. Comparative Statutory Interpretation: 
How and Why the Methods Used to 
Interpret Each Element Differ
A. How the Natures of the Elements Differ
The compositions of the elements of the CWA offense are 
very different . “Addition” is abstract and, because it is the 
action element, is arguably the most important element . 
Yet, the CWA does not define addition . The statute defines 
“pollutant” as an exclusive list of 19 materials or catego-
ries of materials, with two exceptions .65 Some of the listed 
materials are not commonly thought of as pollutants, for 
example, rock and sand; and many of the categories of 
materials are very broad, for example, “biological material” 
and “industrial waste .” “Navigable waters” has a long his-
tory as a term of art developed by the Supreme Court to 
establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause66 
over waters used in the past for navigation, used presently 
for navigation, or usable in the future for navigation, with 
reasonable improvements .67 The statute, however, defines 
navigable waters with the short phrase “waters of the United 
States,”68 having no apparent meaning and no apparent 
connection with navigability . “Point source” has no com-
64 . Calculate the percent of environmentally positive results using any of these 
interpretive devices (3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21) in the same manner as 
for interpretive device 22 or 23 .
65 . CWA §502(6), 33 U .S .C . §1362(6) .
66 . U .S . Const . art . III, cl . 8 .
67 . Miller, 45 ELR 10548, 10550-55, supra note 3 .
68 . CWA §502(7), 33 U .S .C . §1362(7) .
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mon meaning, but is a legislative construct in the CWA . 
The statute defines point source as a “discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance,” including a nonexclusive list of 
11 examples, and providing two exclusions .69 Two of the 
definitions include lists, but they use lists differently . The 
definition of pollutant limits pollutants to listed materials 
and categories of materials, while the definition of point 
source is a “conveyance” and includes a non-limiting list 
of examples .
The compositions of these elements are so diverse that 
courts naturally use different approaches to interpret them . 
This part of the Article will explore those differences .
B. How the Methods Used to Interpret Each 
Element Differ
1. Addition
Addition is the action element in the offense . Because 
offenses are actions, addition is the central element of the 
offense . Because addition is the only element without a 
statutory definition, a regulatory definition, or even legis-
lative history bearing directly on its meaning, it is likely 
to be the most difficult of the elements to interpret . This 
likelihood is increased because addition is an abstract 
idea rather than a concrete thing, like sand, a convey-
ance, or water (words used in the statutory definitions of 
the other elements) .
Indeed, the author found addition the most difficult 
of the elements to interpret in these articles . One tangible 
sign of the difficulty was that the author was able to sum-
marize in two paragraphs interpretations with environ-
mentally positive and environmentally negative results in 
the articles examining pollutant or point source,70 but not 
in the articles examining addition or navigable waters .71 
The articles on addition and navigable waters are compa-
rable in length, and both are appreciably longer than the 
articles on the other two elements . Because the article on 
navigable waters analyzes twice as many judicial interpre-
tations as the article on addition, however, their compa-
rable lengths suggests that addition is the more difficult of 
the two terms to interpret . Of course, there is no agreed-
upon scale of difficulty for interpreting different statutory 
texts, as there is for performing different dives in diving 
competitions . However, several observations made from 
the data set studied in these articles lend objective weight 
to the suggestion that addition is the most difficult element 
of the CWA offense to interpret .
First, when an element is difficult to interpret, courts 
can be expected to use more interpretive tools than when an 
element is easy to interpret . The relative difficulty in inter-
preting the elements, therefore, is reflected by the average 
number of devices courts have used to interpret them: 3 .0 
devices for interpreting addition, 2 .8 for point source, 2 .6 
69 . CWA §502(14), 33 U .S .C . §1362(14) .
70 . Miller, 44 ELR 10963-64; 45 ELR 11136-37, supra note 3 .
71 . Miller, 44 ELR 10770-807; 45 ELR 10548-88, supra note 3 .
for navigable waters, and 2 .5 for pollutant .72 Alternatively, 
the greater number of devices the courts used to interpret 
addition could reflect the relatively greater percent of envi-
ronmentally negative decisions interpreting addition than 
interpreting the other elements and the courts’ apparent 
need to provide greater justification for environmentally 
negative than for environmentally positive decisions .73 
Although these numbers are not hugely different, together 
with the other observations made here, they suggest that 
addition is the most difficult element to interpret .
Next, there are fewer judicial interpretations of addition 
than interpretations of any of the other elements . There are 
63 judicial interpretations of addition; 70 of pollutant; 142 of 
navigable waters; and 72 of point source . Why does the lower 
number of addition interpretations suggest relative difficulty 
of interpretation? Because addition is not defined and is 
abstract, parties have a hard time framing legal issues based 
on it, harder than framing issues based on better-defined and 
less-abstract elements . With fewer parties making an issue of 
the addition element, fewer court decisions interpret it . The 
differences between the numbers of interpretations of addi-
tion, pollutant, and point source are not huge, but, again, 
when supported by other factors, they are suggestive that 
addition is the most difficult element to interpret .
Next, addition is the only element for which courts used 
the interpretive devices of metaphor and metamorphosis .74 
Neither are canons of construction .75 They do not instruct 
us how to interpret an element; rather, they provide visual 
images to help understand abstract ideas . This does not 
help us decide which of several interpretations of addition 
is correct, as some canons of construction, such as legisla-
tive history, may do directly . But it does help to understand 
possible interpretations of addition . Metamorphosis is the 
phenomenon by which one thing becomes another, as a 
caterpillar slowly morphs into a butterfly in the cocoon . 
Often, metamorphosis is fanciful, as a man becoming a 
beetle in Kafka’s novel, Metamorphosis, or a man becoming 
a rhinoceros in Ionesco’s play, The Rhinoceros.
Thus, in United States v. Deaton, the court wrote “once 
that material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit 
in that same wetland added a pollutant where none had 
been before .”76 Several decisions, following arguments by 
the government, posit that bottom sediment dredged from 
72 . To calculate the average number of devices used to interpret a particular 
element, add the number of interpretive devices used in Column F of Table 
B for the interpretations of that element and divide that sum by the number 
of interpretations for that element listed on Table B .
73 . Only 68% of the decisions interpreting addition were environmentally posi-
tive, while 77% of the decisions interpreting pollutant, 77% of the decisions 
interpreting navigable waters, and 75% of the decisions interpreting point 
source were environmentally positive . To calculate the percent of environmen-
tally positive interpretations of an element, count the number of interpreta-
tions of that element with a (+) in Column C of Table B for all levels of court 
and divide the sum by the total number of interpretations of that element .
74 . See Column E of Table B for interpretive devices 18 and 19 (metaphor 
and metamorphosis) .
75 . Neither Eskridge nor Justice Scalia and Garner identify them as canons of 
construction in their books on the canons . See Eskridge, supra note 8; Sca-
lia & Garner, supra note 9 .
76 . 209 F .3d 331, 335-36, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) . The whole pas-
sage reads:
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a wetland suddenly morphs into a pollutant when it is 
replaced in the same wetland,77 a fanciful metamorphosis 
enabling there to be an addition of a pollutant to the wet-
land and therefore a violation of the CWA . The use of a 
fanciful metamorphosis in these interpretations, although 
elegant, suggests that the argument that a violation has 
occurred may be equally fanciful .
Another interpretive fiction suggested by EPA is the 
notion that all navigable waters are one, the so-called 
unitary navigable waters theory . The theory initially 
sounds plausible, alluding to the scientific notions of 
the hydrological cycle and the hydrosphere, in which 
all waters78 are connected . But the totality of navigable 
waters is far from either the hydrological cycle or the 
hydrosphere . Both the hydrological cycle and the hydro-
sphere include water vapor in the atmosphere, clouds, 
precipitation, non-navigable surface water, groundwater, 
and water beyond the control of the United States, while 
EPA does not claim that any of them are navigable water 
under CWA §502(7) or any other CWA text . While 
EPA’s unified navigable water fantasy appears to relate 
to the definition of “navigable waters,” its sole purpose is 
to establish that when a person withdraws polluted water 
from one body of navigable water and discharges it into 
a less polluted body of navigable water, he does not add 
pollutants to the second body of water because both bod-
ies are the same navigable water . Indeed, EPA claims the 
notion flows from the addition element .79
Whenever EPA’s interpretations depart so far from the 
wording of the CWA, they are suspect as pure fantasy . 
This is illustrated by the metaphors associated with EPA’s 
arguments . For instance, to illustrate the abstract idea of 
addition (or non-addition), the Supreme Court used the 
metaphor of taking “a ladle of soup from a pot, lift[ing] it 
above the pot, and pour[ing] it back into the pot” to suggest 
how a discharger could remove polluted water from a water 
body and pour it back into the same water body without 
adding anything to the water body .80 The better metaphor 
The idea that there could be an addition of a pollutant without 
an addition of material seems to us entirely unremarkable, at least 
when an activity transforms some material from a non-pollutant 
into a pollutant, as occurred here . In the course of digging a ditch 
across the Deaton property, the contractor removed earth and veg-
etable matter from the wetland . Once it was removed that material 
became “dredged spoil,” a statutory pollutant and a type of material 
that up until then was not present on the Deaton property . It is 
of no consequence that what is now dredged spoil was previously 
present on the same property in the less threatening form of dirt 
and vegetation in an undisturbed state . What is important is that 
once that material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in 
that same wetland added a pollutant where none had been before .
 The court did not explain why earth and vegetable matter were less threaten-
ing before they were removed from the ditch bottom than when they were 
replaced there .
77 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10770, n .23, supra note 3 .
78 . Or almost all . Some pockets of groundwater have been isolated from other 
waters for millions of years . But it was once surface water, as perhaps it could 
be again in the far-off future .
79 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10781-94; 45 ELR 10578-80, supra note 3 .
80 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 
95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc . v . New York, 273 F .3d 481, 492 (2d Cir . 2001)) . Both deci-
sions rejected the concept of unitary navigable waters, see Miller, 44 ELR at 
in this situation would be two soup pots on the same stove, 
one with split pea soup and another with chicken noodle 
soup . Lifting a ladle of split pea soup and placing it into the 
chicken noodle soup adds pollutants to the chicken noodle 
soup (imagine green chicken noodle soup), even though 
both vessels are soup pots, both are filled with soup, and 
both are on the same stove . Several other decisions used 
metaphors in their analysis of addition .81
2. Pollutant
The definition of pollutant is an exclusive list of specific 
substances, such as rock and sand, and broad categories of 
substances, such as “biological materials .” The exclusivity 
of the list, the specific nature of the materials listed, and 
the broad nature of the listed categories of materials sug-
gest that plain meaning will be the predominant device 
used to interpret the element, the interpretation of the pol-
lutant element will be relatively easy, and the results will be 
largely environmentally positive .
Courts used precedent and plain meaning more than 
any other devices to interpret all of the elements . But while 
they generally used precedent more than plain meaning, 
courts used plain meaning in 49 of the 70 interpretations 
of pollutant, and used precedent in only 36 of them . While 
courts also used plain meaning more than precedent to 
interpret addition, they did so only by a very slight mar-
gin .82 Moreover, courts used only one interpretive device in 
25 of their 70 interpretations of pollutant, and 16 of those 
25 interpretations used plain meaning .83
The predominance of plain meaning in the interpreta-
tion of pollutant is a strong indication that the element is 
relatively easy to interpret . This is confirmed by the rela-
tively smaller number of devices the courts used to interpret 
pollutant than to interpret the other elements . As noted ear-
lier, the courts used 25 interpretive devices to interpret the 
four elements . But courts did not use all 25 of the devices 
to interpret any one of the elements; they used 12 devices to 
interpret pollutant, 13 to interpret addition, 18 to interpret 
point source, and 20 to interpret navigable waters .84
As discussed above, decisions interpreting more difficult 
text use more interpretive devices than decisions interpret-
ing less difficult text . The average number of devices used to 
interpret pollutant is less than the average number of devices 
used to interpret the other elements: 2 .5 for pollutant, 2 .8 
10782-83, supra note 3 . Both decisions questioned or rejected the concept 
that discharging a polluted navigable water into a pristine navigable water 
did not add a pollutant to the pristine water . See the author’s earlier article 
on Addition, 44 ELR at 10782-83, 10788-90, supra note 3 .
81 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10770, n .241, supra note 3 .
82 . Courts used plain meaning 52 times and precedent 51 times to interpret addi-
tion . They used plain meaning 22 times and precedent 131 times to interpret 
navigable waters . And they used plain meaning 42 times and precedent 63 
times to interpret point source . To calculate how many decisions interpreting 
an element used a particular interpretive device, see supra note 27 .
83 . Count the number of decisions with only interpretive device 22 in Column 
E of Table B for pollutant .
84 . To calculate the number of different devices used to interpret an element, 
count the number of different devices (numbers 1 to 25) in Column E of 
Table B for that element .
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for point source, 2 .6 for navigable waters, and 3 .0 for addi-
tion . Moreover, courts used only one device to interpret pol-
lutant in 25 of the 70 interpretations of the term .85 Indeed, 
the sole device in 16 of the 25 interpretations of pollutant 
was plain meaning, while precedent was the dominant sole 
device used to interpret the other elements .86
The positive environmental results of decisions inter-
preting the elements of the CWA offense are 78% for pol-
lutant, 75% for point source, 77% for navigable waters, 
and 68% for addition .87 As explained above, courts use 
more interpretive devices to decide difficult cases and to 
decide cases with environmentally negative results . Many 
of the environmentally negative results interpreting pol-
lutant were in decisions in which the pollutant was perva-
sively regulated by another statute .88
The differences in none of these comparisons are great 
enough by themselves to prove the point . But together they 
are persuasive that pollutant is relatively easy to interpret 
and that plain meaning drives its interpretation .
3. Navigable Waters
Because navigable waters is a term of art the Supreme 
Court developed in a dozen decisions over a century and 
a half to define the extent of federal Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction over waterways, precedent has driven the 
interpretation of that element from the outset . Courts used 
precedent to decide whether waters were navigable under 
the CWA from the first decisions addressing the issue .89 
There was no comparable body of earlier precedent to help 
interpret the other elements . Courts have used precedent 
far more often than plain meaning to interpret navigable 
waters: 131 times as opposed to 22 times . But courts used 
plain meaning somewhat more than precedent to interpret 
the other elements: 153 times as opposed to 144 times .90 
This may change over time as more precedent becomes 
available to interpret the other elements .
Because the interpretation of navigable waters is so 
precedent-driven, the author organized much of the analy-
sis in his earlier article on navigable waters by comparing 
the analyses and outcomes of lower court interpretations 
in groups, starting with lower court interpretations occur-
ring before any Supreme Court ruling on the subject, 
85 . To calculate the percent of interpretations in which the courts used only one 
device to interpret a particular element, count the number of decisions with 
a 1 in Column F of Table B for that element and divide the sum by the total 
of decisions interpreting that element . Courts used only one device in 24% 
of the 62 interpretations of addition, 17% of the 71 interpretations of point 
source, and 28% of the 136 interpretations of navigable waters .
86 . Count the number of decisions with a 1 in Column F of Table B for addi-
tion and divide the sum by the total of decisions interpreting addition (62) .
87 . To calculate the percent of positive environmental results of decisions inter-
preting any element, count the number of interpretations of that element 
with a plus (+) in Column C of Table B for that element and divide the sum 
by the number of interpretations of that element .
88 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10960, supra note 3, nn . 49-57 .
89 . See Column E of Table B for Navigable Waters and note the earliest court of 
appeals and district court decisions, using interpretive device 23 (precedent) .
90 . Count the number of times interpretive devices 22 or 23 (plain meaning 
and precedent) are used in Column E of Table B for each of the elements 
addition, pollutant, and point source and add the three sums .
proceeding with lower court interpretations between suc-
cessive Supreme Court rulings, and ending with lower 
court interpretations after the latest Supreme Court ruling . 
There were noticeable differences between the analyses and 
outcomes of the later groups of interpretations, reflecting 
the influence of the latest Supreme Court precedent .91
For the same reasons, courts have used constitutionally 
based devices to interpret the phrase . Indeed, courts used 
the canons “construe statutes narrowly to avoid constitu-
tional issues” and “honor federalism” to interpret navigable 
waters and did not use them to interpret other elements of 
the CWA offense .92
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court already had 
defined navigable waters in some detail, Congress defined 
the term in the CWA as the “waters of the United States,” a 
term having no obvious or traditional meaning . Why would 
Congress have done so? The relevant committee reports 
and floor statements of the drafters of the statute are quite 
clear on this: Congress defined the term as the waters of the 
United States to cast aside the straitjacket of the traditional 
meaning of navigable waters and replace it with a broader 
term reaching the full extent of Congress’ power over waters 
under the Constitution .93 An interpreter of navigable waters 
as it appears in the CWA would be aware of this if she has 
read the relevant legislative history, but would be puzzled 
by it if she has not . At the same time, the legislative history 
does not explain why Congress failed to jettison the term 
navigable waters altogether and directly use the term waters 
of the United States as the element of the CWA offense .
It is noted above that the use of legislative history to 
interpret the elements of the CWA offense declined pre-
cipitously between the earliest and latest sets of interpreta-
tions because courts questioned its efficacy .94 That decline 
is most aggravated for interpretations of navigable waters . 
In the earliest set of interpretations, courts used legislative 
history in 16 interpretations of navigable waters and in 11 
interpretations of the other elements . In the latest set of 
interpretations, courts used legislative history in one inter-
pretation of navigable waters and in three interpretations 
of the other elements .95
There was a parallel decline in the courts’ use of the 
canon of broad interpretation in decisions interpreting 
navigable waters . In the earliest set of interpretations, 
courts used broad interpretation in 17 interpreting navi-
gable waters, while in the latest set of interpretations, they 
used it in eight interpretations of navigable waters . In deci-
sions interpreting the other elements, however, courts used 
broad interpretation steadily in both sets of interpretations, 
using it in seven interpretations during the earliest period 
91 . See Miller, 45 ELR 10548, supra note 3, at 10558-71 .
92 . Compare the number of times interpretive devices 5 and 15 (interpret stat-
utes to avoid constitutional issues and honor federalism) are used in Col-
umn E of Table B for navigable waters and for addition, pollutant, and 
point source .
93 . See the author’s earlier article on interpreting navigable waters, 45 ELR at 
10551-54, supra note 3 .
94 . See supra note 41 .
95 . Count the number of decisions listing interpretive device 16 in Column E 
of Table B for each element in the earliest and latest sets of decisions .
Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
46 ELR 10308 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 4-2016
and in eight interpretations in the latest set .96 The decline 
in the use of broad interpretation for navigable water can 
be directly attributed to the decline in the use of legislative 
history generally, because the legislative history of naviga-
ble waters explicitly and repeatedly urges that the phrase be 
broadly interpreted and earliest decisions cited that history 
as a reason to broadly interpret the term .
The most striking difference between interpretations 
of navigable waters and interpretations of the other ele-
ments, however, is between the numbers of interpretations 
of each element: 63 for addition, 70 for pollutant, 142 for 
navigable waters, and 72 for point source . The numbers 
of interpretations of pollutant and point source, the two 
elements with list-based definitions, are very close, while 
the number of interpretations of addition is slightly less . 
But the number of interpretations of navigable waters is 
approximately twice the number of interpretations of any 
of the other elements . Navigable waters is the numeri-
cal leader of the elements in other respects . The number 
of Supreme Court interpretations of navigable waters in 
the CWA doubles the numbers of the Court’s interpre-
tations of any of the other elements: two for addition, 
three for pollutant, six for navigable waters, and two for 
point source .97 However, this is probably a function of 
the underlying differences in the total numbers of inter-
pretations of the different elements .
The courts also employed more canons of construc-
tion to interpret navigable waters (20 canons used) than to 
interpret addition (13), pollutant (12), or point source (17) . 
While this partly reflects the much larger number of inter-
pretations of navigable water than of the other elements, 
it also reflects the difficulty courts have had in reconcil-
ing the congressional desire that courts interpret navigable 
waters broadly, as suggested by the congressional definition 
of navigable waters as the waters of the United States, with 
the continued congressional use of the more restrictive 
navigable waters as the element of the CWA offense .
What, then, accounts for the far greater number of inter-
pretations of navigable waters than interpretations of any 
of the other elements? The answer is not evident from the 
nature of the term, its definition, or its legislative history . 
Instead, the answer lies in the predominance of interpre-
tations of navigable waters in cases arising under §404, 
compared to the far lesser importance of interpretations 
of the other elements in cases arising under §404 . Of the 
142 interpretations of navigable waters, 81 or 57% were 
in cases arising under §404, while of the 208 interpreta-
tions of the other elements, 64 or 32% were in cases arising 
under §404 .98 Indeed, when the number of interpretations 
in cases brought under §404 are subtracted from the total 
96 . Count the number of decisions listing interpretive device 4 in Column E of 
Table B for each element in the earliest and latest sets of decisions .
97 . See the numbers of Supreme Court decisions for each element in Table A 
or B .
98 . Count the number of §404 interpretations listed for each element in Col-
umn H of Table B . To calculate the relevant percentages, divide the number 
of §404 interpretations for each element by the total number of interpreta-
tions for each element .
number of interpretations of each element, the numbers of 
the remaining interpretations, almost all in cases brought 
under §402,99 are far more similar: 42 for addition, 40 for 
pollutant, 61 for navigable waters, and 59 for point source .100
Significantly, cases brought under §404 do not raise seri-
ous issues under some of the other elements . For instance, 
the courts are unanimous that earthmoving equipment 
used in filling wetlands are point sources101 and that fill 
material is a “pollutant .”102 The addition element has not 
been a fruitful target for challenge in decisions in cases 
brought under §404 .103 This leaves §404 defendants little 
to argue, except that the periodically dry wetlands they 
are developing are not navigable waters . From the outset, 
it was counterintuitive to many that wetlands, particularly 
those that are dry much of the year, are navigable waters .104 
Hence, the majority of decisions in cases brought under 
§404 focused on navigable waters, 61% or 81 of 142, while 
a minority of interpretations in cases brought under §404 
focused on one of the other elements in the CWA offense, 
31% or 64 of 205 .105
Another partial explanation for the greater number of 
interpretations of navigable waters than of the other elements 
results from EPA’s regulatory treatment of the element . For 
the other elements, EPA either did not promulgate a regu-
latory definition (addition) or promulgated definitions that 
differed only slightly from the statutory definitions (pollut-
ant and point source) .106 EPA did not promulgate a regula-
tory definition of navigable waters, but instead promulgated 
a definition of waters of the United States, the congressional 
definition of navigable waters . By doing so, EPA attempted 
to redirect attention from the historical use and meaning of 
the term navigable waters to the apparently broader statu-
tory waters of the United States definition . Moreover, EPA’s 
definition of waters of the United States is very long and 
detailed, extending far beyond the traditional understand-
ing of navigable waters .107 This signaled the government’s 
intention to implement the CWA’s permit programs, par-
ticularly the §404 program, beyond the traditional under-
standing of navigable waters, inviting additional litigation .
Many of the factors discussed above suggest restrictive 
rather than expansive interpretations of navigable waters: 
99 . Some decisions are under the CWA §401, 33 U .S .C . §1341, the Oil Pollu-
tion Act (OPA), 33 U .S .C . §§2701-2761, ELR Stat . OPA §§1001-7001, 
and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U .S .C . §§4321-
4370f, ELR Stat . NEPA §§2-209 .
100 . Subtract the number of §404 decisions listed for each element from the total 
number of decisions listed for each element .
101 . See Miller, 45 ELR 11129, 11145-46, supra note 3 .
102 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10960, 10974-77, supra note 3 .
103 . See Miller, 44 ELR 10770, 10778-79, 10790-91, supra note 3 .
104 . Indeed, neither the wording nor the legislative history of §404 as it was 
enacted in 1972 mention wetlands nor hint that the section was intended 
to protect wetlands from filling . See Miller, 45 ELR 10548, 10554-56, supra 
note 3 .
105 . Compare the number of §404 interpretations in Column H of Table B for 
navigable waters with the numbers of §404 decisions for addition, pollut-
ant, and point source . To calculate the percent of §404 decisions under an 
element, divide the total of §404 interpretations decisions for that element 
by the total number of interpretations for that element .
106 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
107 . Id.
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the use of the canons of “honor federalism” and “interpret 
statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional issues” exclusively 
to interpret navigable waters; virtually abandoning use of 
legislative history to interpret the element; and curtailing 
the use of the canon of “broad construction” while the leg-
islative history of navigable waters urged use of that canon . 
The cumulative impact of these factors is the decline in 
environmentally positive results interpreting navigable 
waters from 25 or 97% in the earliest set of interpretations 
to 19 or 70% in the latest set of interpretations,108 while the 
percent of environmentally positive interpretations of all 
of the elements between those periods remained virtually 
the same .109
4. Point Source
Because the term point source has no inherent meaning, 
the plain meaning canon of construction is not of much 
use interpreting the phrase . On the other hand, the CWA’s 
definition of point source is the most grammatically com-
plex and detailed of its definitions of the elements . The 
statute defines it as a “discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance,” followed by a non-exclusive list of 11 exam-
ples and ending with two exclusions . Plain meaning can be 
used to interpret the statutory definition, as can interpre-
tive devices centering on lists and exclusions . The complex-
ity of the definition reflects the fact that the term point 
source is a legislative construct with no previous mean-
ing . That complexity suggests relatively more interpretive 
devices may be susceptible to use in understanding it that 
in understanding the other elements .
Because the statutory definition of point source includes 
a long list of examples, cases in which discharges are 
through a listed example are usually easy to decide . Indeed, 
more than one-half the decisions interpreting point source 
use two or fewer interpretive devices and two or fewer prec-
edents .110 Where a case does not involve a discharge through 
a listed conveyance, however, the term point source may be 
particularly difficult to interpret both because of the com-
plexity of the definition and because it is the only element 
in the offense to have an opposite in the CWA, a “non-
point source .” The CWA provides very different programs 
to control discharges from point sources and nonpoint 
sources,111 but it provides no definition of nonpoint source 
108 . To calculate the percent of positive environmental decisions for the earliest 
and latest sets of interpretations of navigable waters, see supra note 48 . To 
calculate the percent of positive environmental decisions for the earliest and 
latest sets of interpretations of other elements, repeat the same procedure 
using the number of positive results in Column C of Table B for element 
and dividing by the total number of interpretations in that set of decisions 
shown supra in note 41 .
109 . To calculate the percent of positive environmental decisions for the earli-
est or latest set of interpretations of all elements, count the number of 
positive results marked by (+) in Column C of Table B for that set of in-
terpretations and divide by 67 (the number of the earliest interpretations 
for all elements) .
110 . Count the number of times that 1 or 2 is listed in Column E of Table B 
for point source (41 of the 72 interpretations listed for point source in 
that column) .
111 . See Miller, 45 ELR 11129, 11131-33, supra note 3 .
and draws no distinct line between the two . Although by 
its construction, nonpoint source is the opposite of a point 
source, that does not tell us whether a nonpoint source is 
something other than a conveyance or is a conveyance that 
is not discernible, confined, and discrete, or both .
Both the statute and its legislative history suggest that 
Congress could not draw a clear line between point and 
nonpoint sources .112 Both suggest that precipitation runoff 
and agricultural waste are usually discharged by nonpoint 
sources, but not always .113 Although the statute and its leg-
islative history suggest only these two differences between 
point and nonpoint sources, most of the discharges of pol-
lutants that courts have held to be from nonpoint sources 
had nothing to do with either precipitation runoff or agri-
cultural wastes .114
The complexity of the statutory definition of point 
source lends itself to use of a wide variety of devices to 
interpret it . For instance, interpretive devices bearing on 
lists and exceptions, including ejusdem generis, expressio 
unius, and noscitur a sociis, are susceptible for use interpret-
ing only elements that have lists and exceptions, pollutant 
and point source . But the list in the definition of point 
source is exclusive, while the list in the definition of pol-
lutant is inclusive . The existence of statutory programs to 
address pollution from both point sources and nonpoint 
sources suggest the structure of the statute should be com-
monly used to interpret the point source definition to 
direct the pollutant discharges at issue into one program or 
the other . Courts used the structure of the statute interpre-
tive device in 18 interpretations of point source .115
Because of the grammatical complexity of the statutory 
definition of point source, and because Congress and EPA 
failed to draw a distinct line between point and nonpoint 
sources, cases in which there is no discharge through a 
listed example may be unusually difficult to decide . Indeed, 
courts used 18 of the 25 interpretive devices to construe 
point source . They used only 13 devices to interpret addi-
tion and 12 to interpret pollutant . Although courts used 
20 devices to interpret navigable water and 18 to interpret 
point source, it took them 142 interpretations to do so 
for navigable water, but only 71 to do so for point source, 
using an average of 2 .8 devices to interpret point source 
and an average of 2 .6 devices to interpret navigable waters .
The failure of Congress or EPA to draw a discernible 
line between point sources and nonpoint sources also 
explains why courts are only a few steps away from adopt-
ing a factors test to help them distinguish between the two 
in situations involving precipitation flow or agricultural 
wastewater .116 The same factors test may be just as useful in 
many other situations .117
112 . Id . at 11129-34 .
113 . Id .
114 . Id . at 11145-48 .
115 . Count the number of times (24) that interpretive device appears in Column 
E for Navigable Waters in Table B .
116 . See Miller, 45 ELR 11129, 11139-44, supra note 3 .
117 . Id .
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III. Conclusions
Studying the interpretations of the four elements of the 
CWA offense informs us of their meanings . Assuming that 
those elements are reasonably representative of other statu-
tory text, this study also provides lessons on statutory inter-
pretation itself . Courts used a total of only 25 interpretive 
devices in the course of 342 interpretations of the elements, 
using only nine of them in 10 or more interpretations . On 
average, courts used 2 .6 devices in each interpretation; 
slightly more than 25% of the interpretations used only a 
single device .
Most of the time courts used a single device, they 
used plain meaning or precedent . Indeed, plain meaning 
and precedent were the predominant devices courts used 
throughout the interpretations, with plain meaning gen-
erally dominating at the outset of interpretations, when 
few precedents were available, and precedent generally 
dominating later, as the number of precedents available 
increased . This was not true for the interpretation of navi-
gable waters, for which precedents were available from the 
outset and which dominated its interpretation throughout .
Other changes in the devices used by courts occurred 
over time—for instance, the use of legislative history 
decreased precipitously over time as developing jurispru-
dence questioned its legitimacy . Courts used a maximum 
of nine devices in any interpretation, and used five or 
more devices in only slightly more that 15% of the inter-
pretations . The number of devices used in an interpreta-
tion increased as the level of court and the depth of legal 
analysis increased . The Supreme Court used twice as many 
devices in its average opinion as district courts used in 
their average opinions . The Supreme Court rarely used a 
single interpretive device, while district courts used a single 
device in nearly one-third of their interpretations .
A few of the interpretive devices inherently encourage 
expansive interpretations of statutory text (for example, 
interpret remedial statutes broadly to achieve their goals), 
while others inherently encourage restrictive interpreta-
tions (for example, interpret statutes to avoid constitu-
tional issues or to harmonize with other statutes) . In the 
context of environmental statutes, expansive and restric-
tive interpretations translate into environmentally positive 
or environmentally negative decisions . It seems likely that 
these patterns would be observed interpreting a great deal 
of other statutory text .
Statutory texts may be different in nature; even the ele-
ments of the same offense studied in these articles are dif-
ferent in nature . Those differences result in courts using 
different analyses and devices to interpret the elements . A 
simple example is that statutory text with a list of covered 
items invites questions whether the list is inclusive or exclu-
sive and, if it is inclusive, whether the item at issue in the 
case is on the list or, if not, whether the item is similar to 
or different from the items listed . These questions and their 
associated canons of construction simply do not apply to 
statutory text lacking a list of covered items .
Differences in the natures of texts analyzed also lead to 
the ease or difficulty of interpreting the texts, as is evident 
from the differences in the natures of the CWA elements 
studied in this series of articles . For instance, pollutant, 
with its exclusive list of specific materials and broad cat-
egories of materials, is relatively easy to interpret by deter-
mining whether the material at issue in a case is on the 
list or within a category of material on the list . On the 
other hand, addition, which is undefined and abstract, is 
relatively difficult to interpret . Although there is no scale 
of difficulty for interpreting statutory texts, several objec-
tive factors comparing the judicial interpretations of the 
addition and pollutant elements of the CWA suggest that 
addition is more difficult to interpret than pollutant .
More sophisticated analyses comparing the interpre-
tations of different statutory texts or different parts of a 
statutory text may help understand the text or its inter-
pretation . For instance, in the author’s earlier article on 
navigable waters, he suggested that one of the reasons there 
are so many more decisions interpreting that element than 
any of the other elements is that courts were comfortable 
interpreting it from the outset of CWA litigation: Courts 
had been interpreting the term for a century and a half in 
other contexts, whereas they had no prior familiarity with 
the other elements of the CWA offense .118 This suggestion 
seemed plausible and the Court’s historic development of 
the meaning of navigable waters certainly explained a great 
deal about judicial interpretation of that phrase .
On closer examination, however, the real reason there 
are so many more decisions interpreting navigable waters 
than interpreting any of the other elements of the CWA 
offense is that there are twice as many decisions in cases 
brought under CWA §404 questioning the existence of 
navigable waters as there are questioning the existence of 
any other element . That, in turn, probably results from the 
comparative strength of legal challenges to the meaning 
of navigable waters in §404 cases, compared to legal chal-
lenges to the meanings of the other elements . This factor 
is not apparent from analyzing navigable waters decisions 
alone, but becomes discernible only from understanding 
all four elements and the decisions analyzing them . The 
author recognized the importance of §404 in interpreting 
navigable waters when he wrote the third article in this 
series, but did not recognize its full importance until he 
had finished analyzing the meanings of all four elements 
and wrote this comparative analysis .
118 . See Miller, 45 ELR 10548, supra note 3 .
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Table A: Decisions Interpreting the Elements of the Water Pollution Offense
Element 
Interpreteda
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013) 3
2. Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013) 4
3. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 39 ELR 20133 (2009) 2
4. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) 3
5. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 36 ELR 20089 (2006) 1
6. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) 1, 3, 4
7. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) 3
8. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 17 ELR 20327 (1987) 3
9. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR 20086 (1985) 3
10. Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero, 456 U.S. 305, 12 ELR 20538 (1982) 2
11. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 6 ELR 20549 (1976) 2
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
12. Natural Res. Def. Council v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other 
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20180 (2013)
1, 4
13. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 41 ELR 20178 (9th Cir. 2011) 4
14. National Pork Producers Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 41 ELR 20115 (5th Cir. 2011) 4
15. United States v. Donovan, 2011 WL 5120605, 42 ELR 20328 (3d Cir. 2011) 3
16. Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 41 ELR 20071 (4th Cir. 2011) 3
17. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010) 4
18. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 40 ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010) 1
19. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir. 2010) 3, 4
20. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180, 40 ELR 20098 (2d Cir. 2010) 4
21. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 39 ELR 20232 (9th Cir. 2009) 3
22. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009) 3, 4
23. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 39 ELR 20148 (8th Cir. 2009) 3
24. Friends of Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 39 ELR 20118 (11th Cir. 2009) 1, 3
25. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 1717 (4th Cir. 2009) 3
26. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir. 2009) 1, 3
27. National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009) 1, 2, 4
28. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008) 4
29. United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir. 2008) 3, 4
30. United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 37 ELR 20265 (11th Cir. 2007) 3
31. Northern Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 37 ELR 20202 (9th Cir. 2007) 3
32. United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 37 ELR 20206 (9th Cir. 2007) 3
33. San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007) 3
34. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 36 ELR 20218 (1st Cir. 2006) 3
35. United States v. Gerke Excavation, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 36 ELR 20200 (7th Cir. 2006) 3, 4
36. Northern Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 36 ELR 20163 (9th Cir. 2006) 3
37. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77, 36 ELR 20111 (2d Cir. 
2006)
1, 3
38. United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 36 ELR 20043 (10th Cir. 2006) 3
39. Baccarat Freemont Dev., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 35 ELR 20212 (9th Cir. 2005) 3
40. Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) 2
41. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir. 2005) 1, 4
42. United States v. Gerke Constr., Inc., 412 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2005), judgment vacated on other grounds, 548 U.S. 
901 (2006)
4
43. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 35 ELR 20049 (2d Cir. 2005) 1
44. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 34 ELR 20104 (11th Cir. 2004) 3, 4
a. 1 = Addition; 2 = Pollutant; 3 = Navigable Waters; and 4 = Point Source.
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45. United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004) 3
46. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 34 ELR 20022 (7th Cir. 2004) 1
47. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003) 3
48. No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 34 ELR 20007 (2d Cir. 2003) 1
49. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) 3
50. United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003) 3
51. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) 3
52. Alabama Rivers Alliance v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 325 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 1
53. Northern Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) 2
54. Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) 2
55. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) 4
56. Altman v. Town of Amherst, N.Y., 47 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2002) 2
57. Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) 3, 4
58. United States v. Krillich, 303 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2002) 3
59. Fishermen Against Destruction of Env’t v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) 4
60. Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) 2, 4
61. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 32 ELR 20475 (11th Cir. 
2002)
1
62. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001) 1, 3
63. Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001) 1, 2, 3, 4
64. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir. 2001) 3
65. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir. 2001) 2, 3
66. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir. 2000) 4
67. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir. 2000) 1, 2
68. Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir. 1999) 2, 3
69. United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (2d Cir. 1999) 3
70. Resource Investments, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 148, 28 ELR 21407 (10th Cir. 1998) 2
71. National Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 28 ELR 21318 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 1
72. Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 28 ELR 21035 (9th Cir. 1998) 2
73. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251. 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir. 1997) 1, 2, 3
74. United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 28 ELR 20202 (3d Cir. 1997) 4
75. North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 112 F.3d 1175, 27 ELR 20929 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 1
76. Chemical Weapons Working Grp., Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir. 1997) 1, 2
77. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997) 2, 3
78. Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996) 1, 3
79. Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 26 ELR 20924 (11th Cir. 1996) 2
80. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir. 1996) 2
81. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 25 ELR 21406 (9th Cir. 1995) 2
82. Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir. 1994) 2, 4
83. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1993) 3
84. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993) 1, 2, 4
85. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993) 2, 4
86. United States v. Pozgsai, 999 F.2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993) 2, 3
87. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 23 ELR 21139 (7th Cir. 1993) 3
88. United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993) 2
89. United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992) 1
90. Save Our Community v. U.S. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992) 1
91. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992) 2, 3
92. American Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir. 1992) 1
93. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991) 4
94. Carr v. Alta Verde Indust., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 21 ELR 21005 (5th Cir. 1991) 4
95. Rybachek v. U.S. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 20 ELR 20973 (9th Cir. 1990) 1, 2
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96. Inland Steel Co. v. U.S. EPA, 901 F.2d 1491, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir. 1990) 3
97. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 19 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1988) 3
98. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers’ Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988) 1, 2, 3
99. Bersani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 850 F.2d 36, 18 ELR 20874 (2d Cir. 1988) 2
100. United States v. M.C.C. of Fla, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir. 1985) 1, 2
101. Conant v. United States, 786 F.2d 1008, 16 ELR 20453 (11th Cir. 1986) 3
102. Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir. 1985) 3
103. Trustees for Alaska v. U.S. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir. 1984) 4
104. United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 15 ELR 20177 (8th Cir. 1984) 3
105. Orleans Audubon Soc’y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 15 ELR 20030 (5th Cir. 1984) 2, 3
106. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 14 ELR 20683 (10th Cir. 1984) 3
107. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992, 14 ELR 20598 (6th Cir. 1983) 1
108. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983) 1, 3, 4
109. United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 13 ELR 20583 (11th Cir. 1983) 3
110. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 1, 2, 4
111. Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 12 ELR 20368 (8th Cir. 1982) 1, 4
112. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 11 ELR 20905 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 3
113. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980) 4
114. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 10 ELR 20184 (5th Cir. 1980) 3
115. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979) 3
116. United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979) 1, 3, 4
117. Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir. 1979) 2
118. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehilke, 578 F.2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th Cir. 1978) 3
119. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 4
120. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir. 1977) 2, 3
121. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977) 3
122. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir. 1977) 2
123. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1976) 1, 4
124. FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 6 ELR 20382 (4th Cir. 1976) 2
125. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 6 ELR 20068 (3d Cir. 1975) 1
126. California v. U.S. EPA, 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1975) 3
127. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974) 3
U.S. District Court Decisions
128. Stillwater of Crown Point Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Kovich, 2011 WL 4818511 (N.D. Ind. 2011) 3
129. Deerfield Plantation Phase II v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2011 WL 2746232 (D.S.C. 2011) 3
130. United States v. Brink, 795 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 2, 3
131. San Francisco Baykeeper v. West Bay Sanitary Dist., 791 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 3
132. United States v. Freedman Farms, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D.N.C. 2011) 3
133. Gouger v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 779 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 2
134. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Coal-Mac, Inc. v, 775 F. Supp. 2d 900, 41 ELR 20141 (S.D. W. Va. 2011) 3
135. United States v. Vierstra, 2011 WL 1064526 (D. Idaho 2011) 3
136. Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Nelson Faria Dairy, Inc., 2011 WL 61882 (E.D. Wash. 2011) 1
137. Gulf Restoration Network v. Hancock Cnty. Dev., LLC, 772 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Miss. 2011) 3
138. Assateague Coastkeeper v. Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm, 727 F. Supp. 2d 433, 40 ELR 20208 (D. Md. 2010) 4
139. United States v. Donovan, 2010 WL 3000058 (D. Del. 2010) 3
140. United States v. Righter, 2010 WL 2640189 (M.D. Pa. 2010) 4
141. National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 699 F. Supp. 2d 209, 40 ELR 20104 (D.D.C. 
2010), vacated on other grounds, 663 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
3, 4
142. Benjamin v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 40 ELR 20283 (D. Or. 2009) 3
143. Stephens v. Koch Foods, LLC, 667 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) 3
144. Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 658 F. Supp. 2d 752 (E.D. Va. 2009) 3
145. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 630 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 1
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146. Alabama Rivers Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2009) 2
147. Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico), 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009) 3
148. Ogeechee-Canooche Riverkeeper, Inc. v. T.C. Logging, Inc., 2009 WL 2390851 (S.D. Ga. 2009) 4
149. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Huffman, 2009 WL 2705854 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), aff ’d, 625 F.3d 159, 40 
ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010)
4
150. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Quilcene National Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W.D. Wash. 2009) 4
151. United States v. Acquest Transp., LLC, 2009 WL 2157005 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) 4
152. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 585 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 180, 40 ELR 
20098 (2d Cir. 2010)
1, 2, 4
153. American Petroleum Inst. v. Johnson, 541 F. Supp. 2d 165, 38 ELR 20081 (D.D.C. 2008) 3
154. United States v. Fabian, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 37 ELR 20083 (N.D. Ind. 2007) 1, 3
155. United States v. Robinson, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2007) 3
156. United States v. Bailey, 516 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Minn. 2007) 3
157. D’Olive Bay Restoration & Preservation Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (S.D. 
Ala. 2007)
2
158. United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 37 ELR 20082 (W.D. Ky. 2007) 3
159. Simbury-Avon Preservation Soc’y, LLP v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 219 (D. Conn. 2007) 2, 3
160. Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 37 ELR 20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 1, 3, 4
161. National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2007 WL 259944, 37 ELR 20028 (D.D.C. 2007) 1
162. United States v. Lippold, 2007 WL 3232483 (C.D. Ill. 2007) 3, 4
163. Friends of Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 3635465 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 1
164. United States v. Marion L. Kincaid Trust, 3 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 3
165. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 36 ELR 20131 (N.D. Tex. 2006) 3
166. Tungett v. Papierski, 2006 WL 51148 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) 2
167. Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 401 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2005) 2
168. United States v. Adams Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 3
169. City of Southacres v. Waterworth, 322 F. Supp. 992 (S.D. Tex. 2004) 2
170. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 332 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D.D.C. 2004) 2
171. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003) 1, 2, 3, 4
172. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Servs., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 4
173. FD&P Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003) 3
174. United States v. Hummel, 2003 WL 1845365 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 1
175. United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002) 3
176. U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Me. 2002) 1, 2, 4
177. California Sportfishing Protecting Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002) 3
178. Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), rev’d on other 
grounds, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003)
2
179. United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 7002) 3
180. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. O’Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. 2002), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 361 F.3d 934 
(7th Cir. 2004)
1, 2
181. United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Ind. 2002) 3
182. Sierra Club & Mineral Pol’y Ctr. v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 2002 WL 33932715 (D. Colo. 2002) 1, 3, 4
183. Altman v. Town of Amherst, N.Y., 190 F. Supp. 2d 467 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d, 47 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2002) 2
184. United States ex rel. McKeown v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 1, 2, 4
185. United States v. Interstates Gen’l Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Md. 2001) 3
186. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001) 3
187. United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) 3
188. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 3
189. American Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000) 1
190. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 30 ELR 20460 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 2
191. No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1401458 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 1
192. Stone v. Naperville Park Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 651 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 4
193. United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 1
Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
4-2016 NEWS & ANALYSIS 46 ELR 10315
Element 
Interpreteda
194. United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 28 ELR 21438 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 1, 3
195. Frobel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Wis. 1998) 1, 4
196. United States v. United Homes, Inc., 1999 WL 117701 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 2
197. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Miss. 1997) 2, 3
198. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997) 3, 4
199. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 27 ELR 21411 (D. Or. 
1997)
3
200. American Mining Cong. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 27 ELR 20589 (D.D.C. 1979) 1
201. Georgia v. City of East Ridge, Tenn., 949 F. Supp. 1571, 27 ELR 20782 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 3
202. RSR Corp. v. Browner, 924 F. Supp. 504, 26 ELR 21353 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 4
203. United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797, 26 ELR 21116 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) 4
204. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 26 ELR 21120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 4
205. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 2, 4
206. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995) 1, 2, 3, 4
207. Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135 (D.N.M. 1995) 3
208. Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, 891 F. Supp. 1389, 26 ELR 20303 (D. Haw. 1995) 4
209. United States v. Banks, 873 F. Supp. 650, 25 ELR 20776 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 3
210. Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994) 3, 4
211. Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73, 25 ELR 20460 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 2
212. Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 24 ELR 20749 (D. Colo. 1993) 3
213. Salt Pond Assocs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 815 F. Supp. 766, 23 ELR 21026 (D. Del. 1993) 1
214. Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 796 F. Supp. 1306, 23 ELR 20267 (N.D. Cal. 
1992)
3
215. United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 22 ELR 21027 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Plaza 
Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993)
4
216. United States v. Zanger, 767 F. Supp. 1030, 22 ELR 20231 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 3
217. United States v. Sinclair Oil Co., 767 F. Supp. 2000, 21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990) 1, 4
218. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 763 F. Supp. 431, 20 ELR 20870 (E.D. Cal. 1989) 3
219. Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass.n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 21 ELR 20647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff ’d 
without opinion, 940 F.2d 649, 21 ELR 21226 (2d Cir. 1991)
2
220. Friends of Sakonmet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 21 ELR 20055 (D.R.I. 1990) 4
221. Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 20 ELR 21001 (D. Vt. 1989, aff ’d on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1088 
(2d Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 22 ELR 21099 (1992)
2
222. West Virginia Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.J. 1989) 3
223. United States v. Malibu Beach, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1301, 19 ELR 21247 (D.N.J. 1989) 3
224. Hanson v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E.D. Tex. 1989) 2, 3
225. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 19 ELR 20124 (E.D. Cal. 1988) 3
226. United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 17 ELR 20783 (W.D. Ky. 1987) 3
227. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 17 ELR 20801 (W.D. Mich. 1987) 1, 2, 4
228. Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442, 16 ELR 20634 (M.D. Pa. 1986) 4
229. Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 16 ELR 20080 (W.D. Mich. 1985) 3
230. Track 12, Inc. v. District Eng’r, 618 F. Supp. 448, 16 ELR 20163 (D. Minn. 1985) 3
231. Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Ark. 1984) 2
232. United States v. Saint Bernard Parish, 589 F. Supp. 617, 14 ELR 20794 (E.D. La. 1984) 3
233. United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 14 ELR 20588 (M.D. Fla. 1984) 3
234. United States v. Champitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984) 3
235. United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 14 ELR 20056 (M.D. Fla. 1983) 2, 3
236. United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D. Md. 1981) 2, 3
237. Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 13 ELR 20055 (E.D. La. 1982) 3
238. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 12 ELR 20268 (D.D.C. 1982) 1, 2
239. United States v. Lee Wood Contractors, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 12 ELR 20421 (C.D. Mich. 1981) 3
240. O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 12 ELR 20239 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 4
241. United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 10 ELR 20698 (M.D. Fla. 1980) 2, 3, 4
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242. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 952, 10 ELR 20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980) 4
243. American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 3
244. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v. Barcelo-
Romero, 643 F.2d 835, 11 ELR 20391 (1st Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305, 12 ELR 20538 (1982)
4
245. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 11 ELR 20315 (W.D. La. 1979) 1
246. United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff ’d, 602 F.2d 1123, 9 ELR 
20556 (3d Cir. 1979)
2
247. South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978) 1, 2, 4
248. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Alexander, 438 F. Supp. 90, 7 ELR 20751 (D.P.R. 1977) 3
249. United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) 1, 3
250. Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114, 8 ELR 20001 (D. Wyo. 1977) 3
251. Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 7 ELR 20031 (D. Haw. 1976) 4
252. Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 5 ELR 20666 (E.D.N.C. 1975) 3
253. Sun Enters., Inc. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 3
254. P.F.Z. Props., Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975) 3
255. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 5 ELR 20285 (D.D.C. 1975) 3
256. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 5 ELR 20308 (D. Ariz. 1975) 3
257. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 5 ELR 20581 (S.D. Tex. 1975) 3
258. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1974) 3, 4
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Table B
Note: Table B is displayed in four subparts, one each for Addition, Pollutant, Navigable Waters, and Point Source. Each draws on, but is 
different from, Table B in the earlier article on that element, cited in note 3, supra. For instance, the subpart tables here use the common 
numbered list of interpretive devices below, while each of the earlier tables used different numbers for the interpretive devices.
Explanation of Columns in Table B for Each Element
Column A. Number of decision from Table A.
Column B. Year of decision. The latest and earliest sets of decisions, see supra n.41, are highlighted.
Column C. Positive or negative environmental results for the element. Positive is an expansive interpretation of the element; negative 
is a restrictive interpretation. The absence of a (+) or (--) in the column means that the decision discussed the element but did not hold 
what it meant. The presence of both a (+) and a (--) in the column means that there were mixed results; for example, the interpretation 
was positive, but the facts did not support a positive result.
Column D. Type of Decision. Cit. S. = citizen suit. Crim. = criminal prosecution. Enf. = civil enforcement by the government. Jud. Rev. = 
judicial review.
Column E. Interpretive devices used for the element, from the list below.
Column F. Number of interpretive devices used for the element.
Column G. Number of precedents used to interpret the element.
Column H. Statutory section for which the element is relevant: CWA §§401, 402, 404, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), or 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA).
Interpretive Devices
1. Absurd results, avoid
2. Administrative issues, avoid
3. Antecedent, rule of last
4. Broad interpretation
5. Constitutional issues, avoid
6. Deference to agency interpretation of statute
7. Deference to agency interpretation of agency rule
8. Ejusdem generis, general term interpreted based on specific 
terms accompanying it
9. Equity
10. Every word, give meaning to
11. Exception, interpret narrowly
12. Exception proves the rule
13. Exclusive/inclusive lists
14. Expressio unius, expression of one thing suggests exclusion of 
others
15. Federalism, honor
16. Legislative history
17. Lenity, rule of
18. Metaphor
19. Metamorphosis
20. Noscitur a sociis, term interpreted in context of other terms 
accompanying it
21. Other statutes, harmonize with
22. Plain meaning
23. Precedent
24. Structure of statute
25. Waiver, interpret narrowly
Table B: Addition
A B C D E F G H
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
5. 2006 + Jud. Rev. 7, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24 6 2 §401
6. 2004 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 7, 22, 23, 24 6 2 §402
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
12. 2011 + Cit. S. 13, 22, 23 3 3 §402
18. 2010 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 7, 22, 23 5 3 §402
24. 2009 -- Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 22, 23 5 6 §402
26. 2009 + Enf. 7, 22, 23, 24 4 4 §404
27. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 1, 4, 7, 13, 19 5 -- §402
37. 2006 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 21, 22, 23, 24 6 5 §402
41. 2005 + Cit. S. 7, 18, 22, 23, 24 5 5 §402
43. 2005 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23, 24 5 1 §402
46. 2004 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23, 24 5 4 §404
48. 2003 + Jud. Rev. 21, 22 2 -- §401
52. 2002 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
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61. 2001 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 18, 22, 23 6 3 §402
62. 2001 + Jud. Rev. 4, 19, 22, 23 4 5 §404
63. 2001 + Cit. S. 21, 22, 23 3 3 §402
67. 2000 + Enf. 4, 19, 22, 23 4 5 §404
71. 1998 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 6 5 §404
73. 1997 -- Crim. 1, 22, 23 3 1 §404
75. 1997 -- Jud. Rev. 20, 22, 23, 24 4 2 §401
76. 1997 -- Cit. S. 1, 4, 21, 23 2 1 §402
78. 1996 + Cit. S. 1, 18, 22, 23 4 3 §402
84. 1993 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §402
89. 1992 + Crim. 22, 23 2 3 §402
90. 1992 -- Cit. S. 7, 22, 23 3 4 §404
92. 1992 + Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 16, 22 4 -- §402
95. 1990 + Jud. Rev. 22, 23 2 2 §402
98. 1988 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 7, 22, 23, 24 5 1 §402
100. 1985 + Enf. 4, 23 2 1 §404
107. 1983 -- Cit. S. 23 1 2 §402
108. 1983 + Cit. S. 3, 16, 22, 23 4 2 §404
110. 1982 -- Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 16, 22, 23, 24 6 4 §402
111. 1982 -- Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
116. 1979 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
123. 1976 -- Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §401
125. 1975 -- Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §402
U.S. District Court Decisions
136. 2011 -- Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
145. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 7, 22, 23 3 4 §402
152. 2008 + Cit. S. 21, 22, 23 3 7 §§402/404
154. 2007 + Enf. 23 1 4 §404
160. 2007 + Cit. S. 23 1 3 §402
161. 2007 -- Jud. Rev. 23 1 1 §404
163. 2006 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24 7 10 §402
171. 2003 + Cit. S. 23 1 2 §402
174. 2003 + Enf. 22, 23 2 6 §404
176. 2002 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §404
180. 2002 -- Cit. S. 22, 23, 24 3 5 §402
182. 2002 + Cit. S. 23 1 6 §404
184. 2001 -- Enf. 22 1 -- §402
189. 2000 + Jud. Rev. 22, 23 2 1 §404
191. 2000 -- Cit. S. 21, 22, 23 3 5 §402
193. 1999 + Enf. 23 1 6 §404
194. 1988 + Enf. 23 1 2 §404
195. 1988 -- Cit. S. 22, 23 2 6 §§402/404
200. 1997 -- Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 7 6 §404
206. 1995 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
213. 1993 -- Enf. 7, 16, 22 3 -- §402
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217. 1990 + Enf. 22, 23, 24 3 3 §404
227. 1987 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 5 §402
238. 1982 + Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 1 §402
245. 1979 + Cit. S. 4, 16, 22 3 -- §402
247. 1978 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
249. 1976 + Enf. 22 1 -- §402
Table B: Pollutant
A B C D E F G H
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
3. 2009 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 7, 22, 24 4 -- §404
10. 1982 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
11. 1976 -- Cit. S. 12, 16, 21, 24 4 -- §402
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal Decisions
27. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 7, 21, 22, 23 4 6 §402
40. 2005 -- Cit. S. 1, 7, 21 22, 23 5 3 §402
53. 2003 + Cit. S. 7, 12, 22, 23, 24 5 6 §402
54. 2003 -- Jud. Rev. 7, 21, 24 3 -- §404
56. 2002 + Cit. S. 7, 23 2 5 §402
60. 2002 -- Cit. S. 1, 8, 22, 23, 24 5 3 §402
63. 2001 + Enf. 22, 23 2 2 §404
65. 2001 + Cit. S. 1, 7, 21, 22, 23 5 1 §402
67. 2000 + Enf. 22, 23 2 1 §404
68. 1999 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
70. 1998 + Jud Rev. 16, 22, 24 3 -- §404
72. 1998 -- Cit. S. 7, 16, 21, 22, 23 5 1 §402
73. 1997 + Crim. 22 1 -- §404
76. 1997 -- Cit. S. 1, 21 2 -- §402
77. 1997 + Crim. 22 1 -- §402
79. 1996 + Cit. S. 23 1 2 §402
80. 1996 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 12, 13, 16, 22, 23 7 8 §402
81. 1995 + Enf. 22 1 -- §402
82. 1994 + Cit. S. 22 1 1 §402
84. 1993 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
85. 1993 + Crim. 22 1 -- §404
86. 1993 + Enf. 22 1 -- §404
88. 1993 + Crim. 22 1 -- §402
91. 1992 -- Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
95. 1990 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §402
98. 1988 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
99. 1988 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
100. 1985 + Enf. 16 1 -- §404
105. 1984 -- Cit. S. 22 1 -- §404
110. 1982 -- Cit. S. 7, 13, 16, 24 4 -- §402
117. 1979 + Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 12, 16, 22, 24 6 -- §404
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120. 1977 + Jud. Rev. 12, 14, 16, 22, 24 5 -- §402
122. 1977 + Crim. 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 5 3 §402
124. 1976 + Jud. Rev. 22, 24 2 -- §402
U.S. District Court Decisions
130. 2011 + Enf. 22 1 -- §404
133. 2011 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
146. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
152. 2008 -- Cit. S. 7, 21, 22, 23 4 10 §402
157. 2007 Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
159. 2007 + Cit. S. 7, 22, 23 3 2 §402
166. 2006 + Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 5 §404
167. 2005 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
169. 2004 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
170. 2004 + Jud. Rev. 22 1 -- §404
171. 2003 + Cit. S. 22, 23, 24 3 6 §§402/404
176. 2002 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 10 §402
178. 2002 + Cit S. 4, 7, 16, 22, 24 5 -- §404
180. 2002 -- Cit. S. 22, 24 2 -- §§402/404
183. 2001 -- Cit. S. 7, 21, 22, 23 4 3 §402
184. 2001 -- Cit. S. 21 1 -- §402
190. 2000 + Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 16, 23, 24 5 5 §402
196. 1999 -- Enf. 16, 22, 23, 24 4 6 §§402/404
197. 1997 + Enf. 22, 23 2 1 §402
205. 1996 + Cit. S. 7, 22, 23 3 4 §402
206. 1995 + Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 2 §402
211. 1994 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
219. 1990 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23, 24 5 3 §402
221. 1989 + Cit. S. 22, 24 2 -- §402
224. 1989 + Enf. 23 1 1 §404
227. 1987 + Cit. S. 7, 22, 23 3 1 §401
231. 1984 + Cit. S. 22 1 1 §402
235. 1983 + Enf. 22 1 -- §404
236. 1981 + Enf. 22, 23 2 3 §404
238. 1982 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 22, 23, 24 5 -- §402
241. 1980 + Enf. 7, 22, 24 3 -- §404
246. 1978 + Crim. 22 1 -- §402
247. 1978 + Cit. S. 1, 22 2 -- §404
Table B: Navigable Waters
A B C D E F G H
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. 2013 + Jud. Rev. 23 1 2 §402
4. 2006 -- Enf. 1, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24 9 19 §404
6. 2004 + Cit. S. 7, 15, 22, 23, 24 5 5 §402
7. 2001 -- Jud. Rev. 1, 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 23, 24 8 2 §404
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8. 1987 Cit. S. 16 1 1 §402
9. 1985 + Enf. 1, 4, 5, 7, 16, 22, 24 7 -- §404
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
15. 2011 + Enf. 23 1 5 §404
16. 2011 -- Jud. Rev. 7, 23 2 6 §404
19. 2010 + Crim. 4, 23 2 4 §§402/404
21. 2009 -- Enf. 4, 21, 22, 23 4 5 §404
22. 2009 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 23 3 5 §402
23. 2009 + Enf. 23 1 6 §404
24. 2009 -- Cit. S. 1, 4, 7, 10, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24 9 10 §402
25. 2009 -- Cit. S. 7, 11, 21, 23 4 2 §402
26. 2009 + Enf. 23 1 8 §404
29. 2008 + Crim. 23 1 3 §404
30. 2007 -- Crim. 23 1 6 §402
31. 2007 + Cit. S. 4, 11, 23 3 7 §402
32. 2007 + Crim. 7, 23 2 9 §§402/404
33. 2007 -- Cit. S. 7, 13, 14, 23 4 9 §402
34. 2006 + Enf. 23 1 3 §404
35. 2006 -- Enf. 23 1 2 §404
36. 2006 + Cit. S. 11, 23 2 6 §402
37. 2006 + Cit. S. 1, 7, 15, 23, 24 5 4 §402
38. 2006 + Crim. 4, 5, 7, 10, 23 5 17 §404
39. 2005 + Jud. Rev. 23 1 5 §404
44. 2004 + Cit. S. 16, 23 2 3 §402
45. 2004 + Crim. 7, 16, 17, 23 4 7 §402
47. 2003 + Bankr. 5, 7, 22, 23 4 7 OPA
49. 2003 + Enf. 4, 23 2 5 §404
50. 2003 + Enf. 23, 25 2 6 §404
51. 2003 + Enf. 5, 7, 23 3 13 §404
57. 2002 + Cit. S. 23 1 3 §402
59. 2002 + Enf. 23, 25 2 4 §404
62. 2001 + Cit. S. 1, 7, 23 3 2 §402
63. 2001 +/-- Enf. 23 1 7 §404
64. 2001 -- Cit. S. 16, 21, 22, 23 4 8 OPA
65. 2001 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 8 §402
68. 1999 + Cit. S. 23 1 2 §402
69. 1999 + Crim. 4, 11, 23 3 5 §402
73. 1997 -- Crim. 5, 23 2 1 §404
77. 1997 + Crim. 4, 23 2 9 §402
78. 1996 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 23, 24 4 4 §402
83. 1994 -- Cit. S. 4, 7, 14, 16, 23 5 7 §402
86. 1993 + Enf. 4, 7, 16, 22, 23, 24 6 12 §404
87. 1993 -- Jud. Rev. 7 1 -- §404
91. 1992 -- Jud. Rev. 23 1 4 §404
96. 1990 -- Enf. 1, 7, 11, 22, 23 5 5 §402
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97. 1988 + Jud. Rev. 16, 21, 22, 23 4 3 §402
98. 1988 -- Cit. S. 7, 23 2 3 §402
101. 1986 + Enf. 4, 11, 23 3 1 §404
102. 1985 + Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 23 3 3 §402
104. 1984 -- Enf. 1, 4, 9 3 -- §401
105. 1984 -- Jud. Rev. 6 1 -- §404
106. 1984 + Decl. Jud. 4, 23 2 12 §404
108. 1983 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 23 4 8 §404
109. 1983 + Enf. 16, 22, 23 3 1 §404
112. 1981 + Taking 4, 23 2 7 §404
114. 1980 + Enf. 23 1 1 §402
115. 1979 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 4 §404
116. 1979 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 2 §402
118. 1978 + Enf. 1, 4, 16, 21, 23 5 2 §404
120. 1977 + Jud. Rev. 3, 4, 7, 10, 13 5 -- §402
121. 1977 -- Jud. Rev. 7, 12, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 7 1 §402
126. 1975 + Jud. Rev. 16, 23 2 2 §402
127. 1974 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 4 §402
U.S. District Court Decisions
128. 2011 + Cit. S. 23 1 4 §404
129. 2011 -- Jud. Rev. 7, 23 2 3 §404
130. 2011 + Enf. 23 1 7 §404
131. 2011 + Cit. S. 23 1 5 §402
132. 2011 -- Crim. 23 1 7 §404
134. 2011 + Cit. S. 23, 24 2 3 §402
135. 2011 + Crim. 4, 22, 23, 24 4 10 §402
137. 2011 + Cit. S. 23 1 5 §404
139. 2010 + Enf. 23 1 8 §404
141. 2010 + Jud. Rev. 13, 23, 24 3 3 §404
142. 2009 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 7 §402
143. 2009 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 2 §402
144. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 7, 23 2 7 §404
147. 2009 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 23 4 14 §402
153. 2008 -- Jud. Rev. 23 1 5 §404
154. 2007 + Enf. 7, 23 2 9 §404
155. 2007 + Crim. 23 1 6 §404
156. 2007 + Enf. 7, 23 2 8 §404
158. 2007 + Enf. 23 1 4 §404
159. 2007 -- Cit. S. 23 1 1 §404
160. 2007 -- Cit. S. 23 1 4 §402
162. 2007 + Crim. 23 1 7 §404
164. 2006 + Enf. 23 1 6 §404
165. 2006 -- Enf. 4, 5, 22, 23 4 8 §402
168. 2003 + Enf. 7, 23 2 13 §404
169. 2003 + Enf. 4, 23 2 6 §404
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171. 2003 + Cit. S. 23 1 10 §§402/404
173. 2003 -- Jud. Rev. 4, 7, 23 3 12 §404
175. 2002 -- Enf. 1, 5, 7, 16, 23 5 2 §404
177. 2002 + Cit. S. 23 1 6 §402
179. 2002 -- Enf. 5, 7, 16, 22, 23 5 2 §404
181. 2002 + Enf. 23, 25 2 3 §404
182. 2002 + Cit. S. 23 1 3 §402
185. 2002 + Enf. 23, 25 2 1 §402
186. 2001 + Cit. S. 4, 16, 23 3 9 §404
187. 2001 + Crim. 4, 16, 23 3 8 §404
188. 2001 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 6 §402
194. 1998 -- Enf. 23 1 2 §404
197. 1997 + Enf. 4, 23 2 1 §402
198. 1997 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 4 §402
199. 1997 -- Cit. S. 2, 4, 7, 16, 22, 23, 24 7 11 §402
201. 1996 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 4 §402
206. 1995 + Cit. S. 23 1 3 §402
207. 1995 +/-- Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 13 §402
209. 1995 + Enf. 23 1 3 §404
210. 1984 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 23 4 7 §402
212. 1993 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 9 §402
214. 1992 + Cit. S. 6, 23 2 1 §404
216. 1991 + Enf. 23 1 3 §404
218. 1989 + Cit. S. 4 1 -- §402
222. 1989 + Jud. Rev. 7, 24 2 -- §404
223. 1989 + Enf. 23 1 2 §404
224. 1989 + Enf. 23 1 1 §404
225. 1988 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 22, 23, 24 6 7 §402
226. 1987 + Enf. 7, 23 2 1 §404
229. 1985 -- Cit. S. 4, 7, 16, 23, 24 5 4 §402
230. 1985 + Jud. Rev. 22, 23 2 2 §404
232. 1984 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 7 §404
233. 1984 + Enf. 7, 23 2 3 §404
234. 1984 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 3 §404
235. 1983 + Enf. 4, 23 2 3 §404
236. 1981 + Enf. 23 1 1 §404
237. 1982 + Jud. Rev. 7, 16, 21, 23 4 3 §404
239. 1981 + Enf. 4, 23 2 2 §404
241. 1980 + Enf. 4, 16, 23 3 5 §404
243. 1979 + Jud. Rev. 23 1 10 §404
248. 1977 + Jud. Rev. 4, 16, 21, 23 4 2 §404
249. 1976 + Enf. 4, 16 2 -- §402
250. 1977 + Jud Rev. 4, 16, 23 3 8 §404
252. 1975 + Cit. S. 7, 23 2 5 §404
253. 1975 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 2 §404
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254. 1975 + Jud. Rev. 16, 23 2 1 §404
255. 1975 + Jud. Rev. 10 1 -- §§402/404
256. 1975 + Crim. 4, 22, 23 3 1 §402
257. 1975 -- Enf. 4, 16, 22, 24 4 2 §402
258. 1974 + Enf. 4, 16, 21, 23, 24 5 5 §404
Table B: Point Source
A B C D E F G H
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
2. 2013 -- Cit. S. 3, 6, 22, 24 4 -- §402
6. 2004 + Cit. S. 4, 8, 22 3 -- §402
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
12. 2011 + Cit. S. 22, 23, 24 3 4 §402
13. 2011 -- Cit. S. 16, 22, 23, 24 4 4 §402
14. 2011 -- Jud. Rev. 22, 23 2 4 §402
17. 2010 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 3 §402
19. 2010 + Crim. 22 1 -- §402
20. 2010 + Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 3 §402
22. 2009 -- Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23, 24 5 7 §402
27. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 4, 22, 23, 24 4 4 §402
28. 2008 -- Cit. S. 23, 24 2 3 §402
29. 2008 + Crim. 16, 22, 23 3 6 §402
35. 2005 + Crim. 23 1 4 §404
41. 2005 + Cit. S. 7, 22, 23, 24 4 5 §402
42. 2005 + Enf. 23 1 4 §404
44. 2004 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 2 §402
55. 2002 -- Cit. S. 3, 7, 10, 22, 23 5 2 §402
57. 2002 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 2 §402
59. 2002 + Cit. S. 22, 23 3 2 §402
60. 2002 -- Cit. S. 23 1 1 §402
63. 2001 + Jud. Rev./Enf. 2, 23 2 1 §404
66. 2000 -- Cit. S. 22, 23 2 5 §§402/404
74. 1997 + Crim. 4, 22, 23 3 5 §402
82. 1994 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23 4 7 §402
84. 1993 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §402
85. 1993 -- Crim. 1, 8, 10, 16, 17, 22, 23 7 7 §402
93. 1991 + Cit. S. 4, 10, 23 3 3 §402
94. 1991 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
103. 1984 + Jud. Rev. 16, 22, 23, 24 4 2 §402
108. 1983 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §402
110. 1982 -- Cit. S. 2, 4, 7, 16, 22, 23, 24 7 1 §402
111. 1982 -- Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
113. 1980 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §402
116. 1979 + Enf. 4, 11, 16, 22, 23, 24 6 2 §402
119. 1977 + Jud. Rev. 6, 16, 18, 23, 24 5 1 §402
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123. 1976 -- Jud. Rev. 22, 24 2 -- §402
U.S. District Court Decisions
138. 2010 + Cit. S. 22 1 -- §402
140. 2010 + Jud. Rev. 1, 23, 24 3 8 §404
141. 2010 + Enf. 22, 23 2 1 §404
148. 2009 -- Cit. S. 7, 23 2 1 §402
149. 2009 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §404
150. 2009 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 10, 21, 23 6 2 §402
151. 2009 + Enf. 23 1 5 §404
152. 2008 -- Cit. S. 23 1 9 §402
160. 2007 + Cit. S. 4, 22, 23 3 7 §402
171. 2003 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 5 §§402/404
172. 2003 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 23 3 3 §402
176. 2002 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4, 5, 23 5 8 §402
182. 2002 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 22, 23 4 3 §402
184. 2001 -- Cit. S. 8, 13, 21, 23 4 5 §402
192. 1999 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
195. 1998 -- Cit. S. 23, 24 2 2 §§402/404
198. 1997 + Cit. S. 1, 23 2 3 §402
202. 1996 + Jud. Rev. 4, 23, 24 3 4 §402
203. 1996 + Crim. 23 1 1 §404
204. 1996 -- Cit. S. 13, 23 2 2 §402
205. 1996 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 8 §402
206. 1995 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 23 3 2 §402
208. 1995 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
210. 1994 + Cit. S. 4, 7, 23 3 8 §402
215. 1991 + Crim. 1, 4, 7, 8, 13, 16, 22, 23, 24 9 5 §402
217. 1990 + Enf. 23 1 3 §404
220. 1990 -- Cit. S. 1, 4, 7, 23 4 3 §402
227. 1987 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 2 §402
228. 1986 + Cit. S. 4, 23 2 4 §402
240. 1981 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 3 §402
241. 1980 + Enf. 22, 23 2 1 §404
242. 1980 + Crim. 22, 23, 24 3 1 §402
244. 1979 + Cit. S. 22, 23 1 2 §402
247. 1978 + Cit. S. 22, 23 2 1 §402
251. 1976 + Cit. S. 6, 24 2 -- NEPA
259. 1974 + Enf. 22 1 -- §402
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